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ARTICLES 
AUER DEFERENCE:  DOUBLING DOWN ON 
DELEGATION’S DEFECTS 
Ronald A. Cass* 
 
Together with the better-known Chevron deference rule, the doctrine 
articulated in Auer v. Robbins two decades ago—which makes reasonable 
administrative constructions of ambiguous administrative rules binding on 
courts in most circumstances—has become a focal point for concerns about 
the expanding administrative state.  Auer deference, even more than Chevron 
deference, enlarges administrative authority in ways that are at odds with 
basic constitutional structures and due process requirements.  Objections to 
Auer have provided cogent reasons for why courts should not grant 
deference to administrative interpretations merely because an agency’s rule 
is unclear.  The most commonly voiced objections, however, do not explain 
why Congress should be disabled in all instances from granting 
administrators discretionary authority over rule interpretation—even in 
settings that do not raise serious risks of partiality or unfair surprise in 
administrative construction. 
Examining the relationship between statutorily directed deference and 
constitutional-structural principles clarifies the essential underlying 
objection to Auer and the limits of that objection.  When Congress by law 
confers discretionary authority that does not exceed its constitutional power 
to delegate functions to an administrator, courts should respect that 
assignment of authority, unless it violates other specific constitutional 
commands.  Yet, when delegations are at most only arguably consistent with 
the Constitution, extending deference—especially expanding deference as 
Auer does in successive determinations—exacerbates delegations’ 
difficulties. 
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for the Rule of Law; President, Cass & Associates, PC; Senior Fellow, Center for the Study 
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A reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine would solve the major Auer 
problem directly, and elimination of Auer-like deference would clearly be 
preferable to retaining the doctrine in its current form.  Short of that, 
demanding that the statutory basis for deference is clearly articulated would 
provide a modest first step in cabining problems associated with 
constitutionally questionable delegations of lawmaking authority.  Those 
who embrace the rule of law, whether advocates or opponents of the modern 
administrative state, should support that step. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Auer v. Robbins1 
announced that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is 
“controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”2  
The internal quotation marks traced the Auer doctrine back through an earlier 
citation to the Court’s 1945 opinion in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,3 
a relatively obscure decision on a challenge to a detail in the administration 
of wartime price controls.4  Auer seemed, at the time, a matter-of-fact 
application of law in a setting that evinced little reason for debate.  It was a 
short, straightforward opinion for a unanimous Court, authored by one of the 
Court’s most universally recognized experts on administrative law:  Justice 
Antonin Scalia. 
In the following two decades, however, the consensus behind Auer 
unraveled.  Justice Scalia himself became one of the doctrine’s most ardent 
critics, declaring publicly that there was “no good reason” for deference to 
an agency interpretation of its own rules.5  He commented privately and 
publicly that the opinion did not grapple with the weakness of the doctrine it 
extracted from Seminole Rock because no one on the Court at the time 
thought the doctrine debatable (a problem he attributed more generally to 
 
 1. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 2. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 
(1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))). 
 3. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 4. See generally id. 
 5. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 
(2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 
50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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unanimous decisions).6  Since that admission, several other justices have also 
openly questioned the doctrine, and the Court limited its application in at 
least one respect.7 
The academic community has also generated a growing body of criticism 
and skepticism about the doctrine.  Specifically, critics comment on its 
evolution from a modest rule for review of price-controls administration, to 
a general rule of deference to interpretations of agency regulations.8  Most 
trenchantly, contemporaneous with Auer’s expansion of Seminole Rock, 
Professor (now Dean) John Manning articulated a cogent assault on 
conflating Chevron deference—deference at least nominally based on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.9—with deference to an agency’s interpretation of its 
own rules.10  Professor Manning explained that the settings in which Chevron 
and Auer apply have very different implications for separation of powers and 
due process concerns about deference.11  Additionally, he explained that 
Auer deference undermines a key due process concept—separating law 
creation and application.12 
The challenges to Auer deference may not undo the doctrine in the near 
term.  Despite the criticisms, some justices may prefer to maintain avenues 
for deference to agency decisions, even while retrenching from the stronger 
forms of deference represented by Chevron and Auer as once conceived by 
Justice Scalia.13 
 
 6. See, e.g., Decker, 568 U.S. at 616–21 (“Our cases have not put forward a persuasive 
justification for Auer deference.  The first case to apply it, Seminole Rock, offered no 
justification whatever . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Decker, 
568 U.S. at 615–16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
567 U.S. 142, 155–59 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive 
Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 924–27 (2017); Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Auer Deference:  Mead, Form, and Function in Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 633, 644 (2014); Sanne H. Knudsen & 
Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47, 68–
99 (2015); Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 943, 953–55 (2017) 
[hereinafter Nielson, Beyond]; see also Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron 
Deference:  A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–10 (2018); Aaron 
Nielson, Reflections on Seminole Rock:  The Past, Present, and Future of Deference to 
Agency Regulatory Interpretations, NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 12. 2016), http://yalejreg.com/ 
nc/reflections-on-seminole-rock-the-past-present-and-future-of-deference-to-agency-
regulatory-interpretations/ [https://perma.cc/Z8Z4-QLEJ]. 
 9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 10. See generally John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996). 
 11. See id. at 638–54.  Because Auer had yet to be decided when Professor Manning wrote 
his article, he referred to Seminole Rock deference, not Auer deference.  Text references to 
Auer deference in describing his work are for consistency with the rest of this Article. 
 12. See id.; see also id. at 669–74. 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238 (2001).  Justice Scalia’s 
view of Chevron deference, as well as of Auer deference, changed over time as he recognized 
that his defense of it as deference to reasonable agency determinations within the scope of 
law-bound agency discretion (as interpreted by courts) did not represent the dominant, 
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Nonetheless, the doctrine should be rejected.  The argument made by 
Professor Manning highlights one legal-structural problem with Auer.14  
Professor Manning’s work, along with other scholarship and commentary 
from Supreme Court justices, also points to potential strategic concerns with 
Auer—ways in which administrators might consciously expand their own 
authority through less clear rules expecting that they will receive deference 
to their subsequent interpretations.15  Reflections on Auer’s impact also point 
to considerations, such as the absence of “fair warning,”16 that intersect with 
both due process and strategic-action critiques.17 
The best reason for abandoning the doctrine, however, is not either of the 
principal arguments already suggested by scholars and justices disaffected 
with Auer.  Instead, deference to agency interpretations of agency rules 
should be seen as problematic in settings where the agency’s authority itself 
is problematic for reasons directly related to questions about how that 
authority fits specific statutory instructions and, more generally, the 
underlying constitutional structure.  The set of considerations associated with 
concerns over the sort of authority delegated to administrators holds the key 
to understanding Auer’s difficulty.  Finding grounds to believe that 
administrators actually enjoy statutory discretion to both adopt rules and 
interpret them is the starting point.  More often, the problem lies in the nature 
of the statutory delegation.  Simply put, in settings that do not involve 
questionable delegations of authority, deference is defensible (even when not 
preferable)—but where agency authority exceeds or at least strains 
constitutional-structural limits, deference has particularly pernicious effects. 
At times, agency authority is clearly within the bounds of executive power, 
and the rules being interpreted and applied make the sorts of technical or 
managerial judgments that appropriately are left to administrators.18  In those 
 
consistent approach taken by the courts. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Administrative Law in 
Nino’s Wake:  The Scalia Effect on Method and Doctrine, 32 J.L. & POL. 277, 287–90 (2017). 
 14. See Manning, supra note 10, at 631–54 (discussing the legal-structural problem that 
was established in Seminole Rock “[b]y permitting agencies both to write regulations and to 
construe them authoritatively”); see also Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 
68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation 
of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA:  Sometimes They Just 
Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 11–12 (1996); Nielson, Beyond, supra note 8 at 953–
57; see also Talk Am., 564 U.S. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. 
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[F]or an agency to issue vague 
regulations . . . maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law 
through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”). 
 16. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156 (2012). 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 155–57; Talk Am., 564 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring); Anthony, 
supra note 15, at 11–12; Manning, supra note 10, at 647–48, 655–57; Nielson, Beyond, supra 
note 8, at 954; Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1485–86 (2011). 
 18. In fact, that has been a principal argument in favor of deference to agency 
determinations cast as interpretations of law, but probably better characterized as decisions on 
matters for which the law prescribes administrative discretion. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson 
Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991).  See generally, 
e.g., Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
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settings, deference to the agency’s interpretation of its own rule may well 
make sense.  The agency, after all, possesses expertise on such matters and 
presumably will better understand and articulate the meaning of a rule that 
may be less clear to judges.  This vision of deference conforms to the 
understanding supporting Seminole Rock.19 
Other times, agency authority is difficult to square with a robust vision of 
constitutionally separated powers, where Congress must, through 
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking processes, make the judgments on 
critical issues.20  In those settings, administrative decision-making, unless 
carefully cabined, at best stretches, and more likely breaks, the separation of 
powers embedded in the Constitution.21  Where that is the case, allowing 
administrators not only to write the rules, but also to receive deference when 
interpreting them, significantly expands a questionable power.  Interpretive 
deference inevitably accords scope for administrators to reinterpret and 
revise the rules.22  Arguments for expertise, efficiency, or predictability must 
be viewed differently—and a great deal more skeptically—in such settings.  
Auer serves, in this context, to magnify problems created by a nonworking 
nondelegation doctrine.  Reinvigorating that doctrine would be beneficial, 
but replacing Auer with a more thoughtful approach to deference is an 
essential first step. 
 
549 (1985); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA:  From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:  Why Administrators 
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Political Accountability and Delegated Power:  A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. 
REV. 391 (1987). 
 19. See, e.g., Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 55–63. 
 20. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered:  A Delegation Doctrine for the 
Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 141–61 (2016); Gary Lawson, 
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335–53 (2002).  See generally, e.g., 
Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion:  How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463 (2015); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine:  Could the 
Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, Substance]; 
David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional 
Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (1987) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, 
Separation of Powers]. 
 21. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1035, 1042–43 (2007) [hereinafter Alexander & Prakash, Running Riot]; Larry 
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1311–12 (2003); Cass, supra note 20, at 177; Lawson, 
supra note 20, at 343–53; Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 20, at 378–79. 
 22. Post-Auer decisions have somewhat reduced the scope for such revisionist authority. 
See generally Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012).  Scholarly 
commentary has suggested other amendments to Auer that could further limit that authority. 
See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 677–93; Nielson, Beyond, supra note 8, at 989–1001; 
Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1466–1503; Walker, supra note 8, at 107–10; Derek 
A. Woodman, Rethinking Auer Deference:  Agency Regulations and Due Process Notice, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1746–48 (2014).  As discussed infra, however, deference to agency 
rule interpretation predicated on Auer necessarily accords a degree of additional authority at 
odds with the sort of concerns articulated by those qualifications of the Auer doctrine. 
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I.  BASICS OF DEFERENCE:  APA TO CHEVRON 
Understanding the need to replace Auer with a more thoughtful approach 
to deference begins with understanding the place of discretion and its 
corollary, deference, in our basic statutory framework for administrative 
process and review of administrative actions—the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA)—and the concepts of governance it incorporates.  That 
framework, along with the Supreme Court’s attempt in Chevron to articulate 
better when deference is appropriate, is the focus of this Part. 
A.  Law Interpretation and Policy Discretion 
The APA, which both codified and organized prior precedents on judicial 
review, states that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of 
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the 
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”23  The Act goes 
on to specify that the court will “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”24 
These provisions plainly make judges the decision makers on questions of 
law—all questions of law—that are properly brought before them for review.  
That much should be common ground to any discussion of judicial review of 
administrative actions.25  For interpretations of law, there is no mention of 
judicial deference to administrators or anyone else in the APA’s direction, 
either on the meaning of statutory provisions or on the “meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action,”26 a phrase that unequivocally 
includes agency rules.27  However, the APA also makes two other matters 
clear that provide grist for a host of arguments about what constitutes a 
question of law and about what questions are properly before courts for 
review. 
First, while courts determine the meaning of statutes and give instruction 
to the agencies on the law’s boundaries around the agencies’ authorized 
sphere of action, the APA contemplates that there are matters on which the 
law grants administrators discretion.28  Exercises of discretion are generally 
 
 23. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 24. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 25. See, e.g., Bamzai, supra note 8, at 989–90; Clark Byse, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Interpretation of Statutes:  An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 
AM. U. 255, 262–63, 266–67 (1988); Ronald A. Cass, Is Chevron’s Game Worth the Candle?  
Burning Interpretation at Both Ends, in LIBERTY’S NEMESIS:  THE UNCHECKED EXPANSION OF 
THE STATE 57, 57–58 (Dean Reuter & John Yoo eds., 2016); Cynthia Farina, Statutory 
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 
472–73 (1989); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:  Separating Interpretation and 
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 187–90 (1992); Antonin Scalia, 
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512–14. 
 26. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 27. Id. § 551(13) (“‘[A]gency action’ includes the whole or a part of an agency 
rule . . . .”). 
 28. Id. §§ 701(a)(2), 706(2); see also The Chevron Doctrine:  Constitutional and Statutory 
Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory 
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reviewable, but only for certain defects of reasoning or process, rather than 
for simple mistakes in judgment.  The basic rule of deference to 
administrative judgments on matters of discretion is encapsulated in the 
provision for reviewing courts to set aside agency decisions that are 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”29 
Second, the scope of the courts’ authority to review—and, thus, 
necessarily, to make decisions on the meaning of legal instructions and the 
consistency of agency actions with them—is also limited by the law’s 
commitment of discretion to an agency.  The introductory language to the 
APA’s chapter on judicial review states that “[t]his chapter applies . . . except 
to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action 
is committed to agency discretion by law.”30  Statutory preclusion of judicial 
review necessarily excepts from review all matters of administrative 
discretion.31  Commitment of a matter to agency discretion gives 
administrators a zone of unreviewable discretion for a subset of 
determinations otherwise subject to judicial scrutiny under the APA.32 
B.  Discretion:  Reviewable and Not 
Understanding just where the line is between what courts can review and 
what falls within administrators’ unreviewable discretion—and how to think 
about those issues—is important and has a fairly clear logic within the text 
of the law.  The understanding starts with the way the APA’s two references 
to review of agency discretionary decision-making fit together. 
1.  Ordinary Discretion 
The instructions in APA section 701 on the applicability of the provisions 
on judicial review and section 706 on the specific standards to be employed 
in judicial review describe two sides of the same coin with respect to agency 
discretion and judicial authority.33  When matters are properly before them, 
courts pronounce the meaning of law but do not intrude on matters of 
implementation given to agency discretion.  That is the reason that section 
701 makes the review chapter applicable “except to the extent that . . . agency 
action is committed to agency discretion by law.”34  The emphasized wording 
is plainly different from a statement that review is unavailable whenever 
 
Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 47–50, 
52–55 (2016) (statement of George Shepherd, Professor, Emory University School of Law); 
Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion:  The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1488–89 
(1982). 
 29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
 30. Id. § 701(a). 
 31. See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 469, 495–502 (1986). 
 32. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599–601 (1988); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
 33. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 706(2). 
 34. Id. § 701(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
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agency action is committed to agency discretion; the law does not employ 
that wording or other, similar language indicating that any degree of 
discretion, large or small, ousts courts of review authority. 
The sense of the APA’s phrasing is that whatever discretion the law gives 
to the agency lies outside the purview of judicial second-guessing, but most 
discretionary authority coexists with review of some dimension.  So, for 
example, the Federal Communications Act’s assignment of broad authority 
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to allocate the radio 
spectrum to different broadcasting outlets and to select licensees to operate 
them,35 obviously is not unlimited.  It would not encompass preferences for 
commissioners’ relatives or failure to accord statutorily prescribed hearing 
rights to applicants.36  This was accepted law before the APA and comports 
with section 706’s directive for courts to set aside actions that constitute an 
abuse of discretion—agency discretion generally permits action up to (but 
only up to) the limits set by governing legal instructions and in many settings 
also by notions of reasonableness and procedural regularity. 
2.  Discretion Beyond Review 
At times, however, the level of decision-making discretion given to 
agencies does not allow for any meaningful judicial review.  Imagine, for 
example, that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is given 
clear discretion by law to decide which agents to send on particular 
assignments.  Permitting judicial review of the director’s decisions would 
inevitably undermine his authority as director and potentially compromise 
CIA operations.  Claims that he routinely gave the worst, most dangerous 
assignments to evangelical Christians—or Jews or Muslims or Asian 
Americans—could not be brought into court without compromising control 
over agency functioning, which is exactly the opposite of what the 
commitment of discretion to the director was designed to accomplish.  As 
bad as those sorts of discrimination are, the choice the law makes is to live 
with the risk of that occurring (or to address it through avenues other than the 
courts) rather than chance undermining the CIA’s core functions. 
The example above is analogous to allowing players to challenge a football 
coach’s decisions on who should be the primary receiver on a passing play 
or who should be a starting player in a given game.  While a coach can make 
mistakes and even give sway to indefensible prejudices, providing avenues 
for challenging such decisions inevitably undermines the coach’s authority.  
That is not to say there is no recourse for bad decisions by the coach.  A 
pattern of bad decisions (or even an especially significant single bad 
decision) based on personal, religious, racial, or other biases rather than 
reasoned judgment on players’ merits would harm team performance and, of 
course, could provide ground for the team’s management to replace the 
 
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2012); see also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 
(1940). 
 36. See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945). 
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coach.  In fact, management could replace the coach simply because it deems 
the coach’s decisions inappropriate or based on biases that management does 
not endorse or accept.  But reviewing each decision to assess its basis is 
incompatible with vesting authority in the coach. 
Similarly, bad management by the CIA director would provide reason for 
the president to replace the director.  But the notion of judicial review 
coexisting with discretion in the director’s decisions on how to deploy his 
personnel—just like review of coaching decisions on use of players—is 
unreasonable.  That is why APA section 701 supposes that there are some 
decisions for which the extent of discretion given by law effectively prevents 
review.37 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Webster v. Doe,38 in a factual setting 
close to the CIA hypothetical above, takes up the scope of section 701’s 
exception for decisions committed to agency discretion by law.39  Section 
102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 states that “the Director of 
Central Intelligence may, in the discretion of the Director, terminate the 
employment of any officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency 
whenever the Director deems the termination of employment of such officer 
or employee necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.”40  
A “covert electronics technician”41 employed by the CIA was terminated on 
the ground that his “homosexuality posed a threat to security.”42  The nature 
of the threat was not disclosed to the employee or during subsequent 
litigation, which asserted, among other things, violations of the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.43 
The majority declared that the statute’s language “fairly exudes deference 
to the Director, and appears . . . to foreclose the application of any 
meaningful judicial standard of review.”44  It added, “[t]he language of 
§ 102(c) thus strongly suggests that its implementation was ‘committed to 
agency discretion by law’”45 and also observed that “assessment [of whether 
a termination protects the interests of the United States] is the Director’s 
alone.”46  The majority repeated that “the section does commit employment 
termination decisions to the Director’s discretion, and precludes challenges 
to these decisions based upon the statutory language of § 102(c).”47  Yet, the 
majority also decided that the law permits “consideration of colorable 
constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the Director pursuant to 
 
 37. See, e.g., Harvey Saferstein, Nonreviewability:  A Functional Analysis of “Committed 
to Agency Discretion,” 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 368 (1968). 
 38. 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 39. See generally id. 
 40. 50 U.S.C. § 3036(e)(1) (2012). 
 41. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. at 594. 
 42. Id. at 595. 
 43. Id. at 596. 
 44. Id. at 600. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 603. 
 47. Id. 
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[§ 102(c)]”48 because those claims are not to be presumed barred without a 
“heightened showing”49 of legislative intent to do that.50 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Scalia agreed that the 
termination decision is committed to the director’s discretion, and his alone, 
but dissented from the conclusion that it could still be subject to review for 
possible constitutional defect.51  Justice O’Connor observed that the 
protection of national security lies at the core of executive responsibility and 
the commitment of discretion to the executive branch in such matters is 
consistent with constitutional design and historical practice.52 
Even more than Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia framed the matter in 
terms of the division between discretion that is made unreviewable by APA 
section 701(a)(2) and other discretion (what might be termed “ordinary” 
discretion).53  He explained that section 701(a)(2) covers “discretion . . . ‘of 
the sort that is traditionally unreviewable’” and “operates to keep certain 
categories of agency action out of the courts; but when agency action is 
appropriately in the courts, abuse of discretion is of course grounds for 
reversal.”54  In addition to the sort of security-related judgments presented in 
the legislation at issue in Webster v. Doe, the category of unreviewable 
discretion encompasses judgments assigned to prosecutorial discretion.  
These include prosecution-like regulatory enforcement, such as the 
discretion recognized in Heckler v. Chaney,55 which rejected as 
unreviewable a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
failure to bring enforcement actions against allegedly unauthorized uses of 
FDA-approved drugs.56 
Scalia’s Webster v. Doe dissent explained that the difference between the 
phrasing of the first provision of APA section 701(a) (“statutes preclude 
judicial review”) and the second provision (“committed to agency discretion 
by law”) reflects the broader set of legal rules that insulate certain decisions 
from review in the latter setting.57  In essence, his argument is that the 
structure of government and of historically accepted roles for executive and 
other officials place certain decisions squarely in executive hands and, hence, 
without clear statutory instruction to the contrary, off-limits to courts.58 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 603–04. 
 51. Id. at 605–06 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 606–10 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 605–06 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 53. Id. at 606–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 610. 
 55. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 56. Id. at 837–38; see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. at 608–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 57. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. at 608–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 58. See id. 
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C.  Chevron:  Discretion’s Sounds of Silence 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron has spawned a 
voluminous literature,59 the decision as conceived and understood at the time 
was entirely in line with the approaches embraced in the APA.60  Further, 
even though Chevron predates those approaches, it was also consistent with 
the approaches taken in Chaney and in the O’Connor and Scalia dissents in 
Webster v. Doe.  Chevron concerned the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) implementation of section 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977.61  That provision required states that failed to meet 
national air quality standards (“nonattainment” states) to set up permit 
programs to regulate emissions from “new or modified major stationary 
sources” of pollution.62  The EPA adopted a rule that permitted states to treat 
“pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though 
they were encased within a single ‘bubble.’”63  For example, it would allow 
states to implement section 172(b)(6)’s mandate by treating all smokestacks 
on a single factory property as one “stationary source” for purposes of 
regulation.64 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the EPA’s 
rule as contrary to the meaning of the law’s requirement to regulate emissions 
from “stationary sources” and asserted that each individual smokestack had 
to be regulated independently.65  The Supreme Court, reversing the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, upheld the EPA rule as a reasonable 
policy judgment on a matter within its authority under a complex statutory 
scheme that did not explicitly define the meaning of “stationary source.”66  
The Court emphasized that the dispute over the “bubble concept” was in 
reality a debate over policy, concluding: 
The arguments over policy that are advanced in the parties’ briefs 
create the impression that respondents are now waging in a judicial forum 
a specific policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agency and in the 
 
 59. In fact, Chevron is the most cited and most discussed decision in administrative law. 
See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:  How Chevron Has 
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782 (2010); Gary 
Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All:  The Origins of the 
Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013); Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens 
and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2012); Peter L. Strauss, 
“Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore 
Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144 n.1 (2012). 
 60. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron:  The Making of an Accidental 
Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 398–402 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).  
Chevron actually was not decided under the APA, but instead under a provision of the Clean 
Air Act that repeated—almost verbatim—the relevant scope-of-review language from APA 
section 706. 
 61. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 846–47. 
 65. Id. at 859–60. 
 66. Id. at 859–66. 
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32 jurisdictions opting for the “bubble concept,” but one which was never 
waged in the Congress.67 
The Court went on, “[t]he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such 
policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the 
public interest are not judicial ones:  ‘Our Constitution vests such 
responsibilities in the political branches.’”68 
Before upholding the EPA’s “bubble concept” as a proper exercise of 
policymaking authority, however, the Court had to establish that the EPA 
possessed the discretion to make that policy choice.69  Although some 
provisions in the Clean Air Act speak expressly to the agency’s discretionary 
authority,70 the language respecting permit programs in “nonattainment” 
states did not.  Recognizing that, the Court made plain in Chevron what it 
had decided in other cases:  that statutory silence or ambiguity could indicate 
a commitment of authority to an agency charged with implementing the 
statutory scheme.71  Chevron’s famous two-step test—asking, first, if the law 
spoke to the precise question at issue (decided by the courts using “traditional 
tools of statutory construction”)72 and, second, if not, whether the agency 
decision fits within a reasonable construction of the law73—simply 
recapitulates the understanding encapsulated in the APA, that the courts 
construe the law, decide how far the law grants discretion to agency 
policymaking, and check reviewable exercises of discretion by agencies only 
for reasonableness.74 
The basic message of Chevron, thus, was neither novel nor in tension with 
prior law.75  It merely held that when the law gives discretion to an executive 
 
 67. Id. at 864. 
 68. Id. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). 
 69. Id. at 843–45. 
 70. For discussion of one example, see generally Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA:  
The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 75 (2007). 
 71. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862, 865. 
 72. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 73. Id. at 842–44. 
 74. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 58; Scalia, supra note 25, at 516.  There are many 
reasoned arguments against Chevron deference. See, e.g., Byse, supra note 25, at 260–61.  See 
generally, e.g., Beermann, supra note 59; Cass, supra note 25; John F. Duffy, 
Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189–211 (1998); 
Farina, supra note 25; Herz, supra note 25.  These arguments are almost invariably predicated 
on applications of Chevron that are in tension with its emphasis on courts as ultimate decision 
makers on statutes’ meaning or on the infelicitous phrasing in parts of the Chevron opinion 
that permitted such applications. See generally Cass, supra note 25 (discussing misconceived 
applications of Chevron). 
 75. See, e.g., id. at 57–58; Lawson & Kam, supra note 59, at 33; Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833–34 (2001); Merrill, supra 
note 60, at 400; Strauss, supra note 59, at 1161–63.  Some arguments promote the idea that 
Chevron can be seen as taking a positive step by clarifying the understanding that laws can 
commit discretion to agencies by implication and, yet, appropriately circumscribing 
deference. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:  Step Two Reconsidered, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1257–58 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its 
Aftermath:  Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. 
L. REV. 301, 310–12 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron 
Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986). 
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official, judges should give deference to the official’s exercise of that 
discretion up to its legal limits.76  As the Court put the point later: 
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron . . . because of a 
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for 
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be 
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather 
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity 
allows.77 
The sense of this position should be evident if one looks, for example, at 
the Communications Act of 1934’s directive to the FCC to allocate radio 
licenses as “the public convenience, interest, or necessity” requires.78  The 
law does not use the words “in its discretion” nor did it need to—the grant of 
discretion was clear from the structure of the law (assigning the FCC wide-
ranging authority over spectrum allocation and licensing) and the broad 
language of the statutory directive.79  As already noted, that implicit grant of 
discretion was not unlimited, and Chevron, consistent with decisions 
stretching back before the APA,80 would recognize both the statutory terms’ 
implicit grant of discretion and the law’s implicit limitations on the agency’s 
discretion.81 
II.  AGENCY RULE INTERPRETATION:  AUER’S WRONG TURN 
Understood as a commonsense canon of statutory construction, Chevron—
in keeping with the APA’s approach to deference and the Supreme Court’s 
elucidation of that approach in cases like Chaney and, more clearly, Justice 
Scalia’s Webster v. Doe dissent—reflects an appreciation that the root 
concepts underlying reviewability and review standards are separation-of-
powers considerations.82  While courts interpret the laws as needed to resolve 
disputes properly before them, they respect the power over implementation 
of the laws assigned to agencies by Congress.  Deference follows 
delegation.83 
 
 76. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 57–58; Ronald A. Cass, Vive la Deference?  
Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1294, 1314 (2015); Scalia, supra note 25, at 516. 
 77. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996). 
 78. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012). 
 79. See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214–17, 224 (1943); FCC 
v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); Cass, supra note 25, at 58. 
 80. See generally, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1943); Gray v. 
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 
(1933). 
 81. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 58; Lawson & Kam, supra note 59, at 33; Merrill, 
supra note 60, at 400. 
 82. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 57; Cass, supra note 76, at 1302–03; Scalia, supra 
note 25, at 515; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference:  Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–120 (2008) (explaining seven levels of deference, keyed 
primarily to statutory and constitutional delegations of authority). 
 83. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 58; Cass, supra note 76, at 1314–15; Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?:  Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the 
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The Court’s decision in Auer, however, is a striking departure from that 
understanding.  It is especially striking given that the decision’s author, 
Justice Scalia, was one of the Court’s strongest and clearest exponents of 
bedrock separation-of-powers concepts.84  Further, the case Auer purports to 
follow, Seminole Rock, can be squared with those concepts in ways Auer 
cannot.  Even the case through which Auer traces its Seminole Rock quote, 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,85 provides little help.  In the 
end, Auer is best seen as announcing a rule that is poorly explained and is an 
unnecessary departure from prior law. 
A.  Right Start, Wrong Turn:  Switching Auer 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. famously opined (in a case he thought 
was not so hard) that “hard cases make bad law.”86  In administrative law, 
however, easy cases repeatedly have been vehicles for announcements of bad 
law.87  The Auer decision and the cases it leaned on for support are examples. 
1.  Simply Chevron 
The plaintiffs in Auer, St. Louis police sergeants and a lieutenant, sued for 
overtime pay allegedly due under terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA).88  The Act’s overtime pay provisions exempt employees who hold 
“executive, administrative, or professional” positions,89 and the Secretary of 
Labor had issued regulations specifying that this exemption applied to 
employees who, among other things, were paid a certain amount on a “salary 
basis.”90  The regulations also explained that payment on a “salary basis” 
required set compensation that was not subject to reduction (within a certain 
time period) “because of variations in the quality or quantity of work 
performed.”91 
The primary arguments in Auer concerned whether the plaintiffs fit the 
definition of “executive, administrative, or professional” employees and 
 
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 742–43 (2002); Manning, supra 
note 10, at 623; Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 25–27 (1983); Robert Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries:  
A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 106–07 (1944), cited in Monaghan, supra, at 
27. 
 84. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417–22 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cass, 
supra note 13, at 279–88. 
 85. 490 U.S. 332 (1989). 
 86. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  For 
a broad explanation of the uneasy fit between facts and principles, see generally Frederick 
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006). 
 87. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (misapplying the “major 
questions” canon of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)); Ass’n 
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–56 (1970) (misreading APA 
section 702 to create a new “zone of interests” test for standing to sue). 
 88. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 455 (1997). 
 89. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 454. 
 90. Auer, 519 U.S at 455. 
 91. Id. 
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whether they were subject to reductions in pay because they could suffer pay 
deductions under disciplinary rules dealing with various regulatory 
infractions.92  Plaintiffs also argued that the Secretary’s rules should not 
apply—at least not in the same way—to public sector employees, by 
specifically asserting that the “no disciplinary deductions” aspect of the 
salary-basis rule cannot reasonably apply in the public sector.93 
At the outset, the Court recounted that “[t]he FLSA grants the Secretary 
broad authority to ‘defin[e] and delimi[t]’ the scope of the exemption for 
executive, administrative, and professional employees.”94  It then observed 
that the FLSA does not provide specific direction on the question presented 
and that it was reasonable for the Secretary to have concluded that the same 
rule can apply to public sector employees as to private sector employees.95 
So far, the Auer Court was engaged in straightforward application of the 
Chevron test in a context in which the law was consistent with the grant of 
significant policy-implementation authority to the Secretary of Labor.  
Despite language sounding as if the question were one of statutory 
interpretation, the Court effectively recognized only the administrative 
discretion to give effect to the general legal directive embodied in the FLSA. 
2.  Reasonable Construction, Unreasoned Deference 
The next segment of the Court’s decision, however, in which it turned to 
application of the Secretary’s salary-basis regulation to the St. Louis police 
officers, took a decidedly wrong turn.  The question was whether being 
“subject to” salary reductions for discipline required regular imposition of 
such deductions on similar employees or only the possibility of their 
imposition under the employees’ terms of employment.96  That question had 
divided the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court had asked the Secretary 
of Labor (who was not a party to the litigation between the police officers 
and the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners) to submit an amicus brief 
explaining his view.97  The Secretary’s brief stated that the regulation applied 
only when disciplinary deductions from employees’ salaries were 
“significantly likely” to be imposed on the employees at issue, and the Court 
found that reading consistent with dictionary meanings of “subject to” as well 
as the logic of the regulation.98 
The problem with Auer was not its acceptance of the Secretary’s reading 
as a proper interpretation of the regulation; on its face, it is a reasonable—
probably the most reasonable—reading of the rule.  The Court erred, 
however, in framing acceptance of that reading as a matter of deference.  In 
the Court’s words:  “Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 457. 
 94. Id. at 456 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(1)). 
 95. Id. at 457–58. 
 96. Id. at 459–60. 
 97. Id. at 460–61. 
 98. Id. at 461–62. 
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Secretary’s own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our 
jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”’  That deferential standard is easily met here.”99  Having 
explained clearly just two years earlier that Chevron deference follows from 
legal delegation of discretion—and only so far as that discretion reaches100—
and then having applied that understanding in the first part of its opinion in 
Auer, one might have thought that the Court would have asked whether the 
FLSA granted discretion to the Secretary that extended far enough to cover 
his interpretation of this regulation. 
In other words, the justices could have asked directly what the parameters 
of the Secretary’s discretion were beyond those necessary to apply Chevron:  
what discretion did the law give the Secretary not only to adopt rules 
implementing the statute and to revise rules if he thought a different 
regulation better advanced relevant policy goals,101 but also to interpret 
regulations already adopted?  The Court’s opinion instead treats the matter 
as if it is disposed of by the regime of deference to agency rule interpretation 
set out in two prior cases, and it articulates a broader deference principle than 
applies under Chevron—and much broader than the terms of the APA. 
B.  Unforced Errors:  Seminole Rock and Robertson102 
Before examining the problem with this approach, it is worth looking at 
the two cases cited by the Auer Court, Seminole Rock and Robertson.  As 
explained below, while those cases did lay out the test repeated in Auer, they 
did not implement it or provide a reasonable basis for it.103 
1.  Seminole Rock’s Pricing Problem 
Seminole Rock concerned the interpretation of a regulation adopted by the 
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration (OPA) under the Price 
Control Act of 1942.104  In keeping with the Act, the Administrator adopted 
a general price control regulation as well as regulations for specific products 
and industries.  The specific regulation challenged in Seminole Rock was 
Maximum Price Regulation No. 188.105  The regulation mandated a price 
“freeze” on building products and pegged maximum prices to those charged 
 
 99. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 
(1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))). 
 100. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1995). 
 101. Respecting revision of rules as part of the Chevron framework, see, for example, Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (explaining 
that the FCC’s choice among policies is discretionary and survives judicial affirmance of a 
different discretionary—not legally mandated—choice). 
 102. This section draws on Brief of Professors—Dean Ronald A. Cass et al.—as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 
1239 (2017) (No. 16-273) [hereinafter Professors’ Brief]. 
 103. See infra Parts II.B.1–4. 
 104. The basic framework for the Act is set out in Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413–16.  See 
also Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 55–59; Helen B. Norem, The “Official 
Interpretation” of Administrative Regulations, 32 IOWA L. REV. 697, 701–10 (1947). 
 105. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 411; 7 Fed. Reg. 5872, 7967, 8943 (July 30, 1942). 
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by the seller in March 1942.106  The regulation also gave three alternative 
methods for calculating prices charged in that month and set the order in 
which those methods should be utilized (starting with a preferred 
methodology with the other methods only used, in the order listed, if facts 
necessary for the preferred, higher-listed approach or approaches were not 
present).107 
The OPA determined that a contract entered into by Seminole Rock for a 
sale of crushed stone to a government contractor violated Regulation No. 188 
and sought enforcement of the regulation in district court.108  The specific 
question posed by the sale was whether the correct maximum price under the 
regulation was fixed by a prior contract entered into in October 1941 or by 
one entered into in January 1942.109  The actual delivery dates for such 
contracts vary depending on the buyer’s need for the stone (used primarily 
for making concrete), and Seminole Rock made a delivery under the earlier 
contract in March 1942 while its delivery under the later contract was delayed 
until August.110  OPA read its regulation as fixing the correct price as that set 
in the October 1941 contract in light of its actual delivery date.111  Seminole 
Rock argued that the regulation’s first-listed methodology required both a 
charge and delivery during March 1942 (not a much earlier contract and later 
delivery); without that, OPA should have used the second-listed 
methodology under which the price that should control was the (far-higher) 
price set in the January 1942 contract.112  Both the district court and court of 
appeals agreed with Seminole Rock.113 
2.  Reading Regulations—Construction’s Traditional Tools 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts.  In explaining the 
basis for its different conclusion, the Court repeatedly emphasized its own 
reading of the regulation at issue.  It stated, for example, “[a]s we read the 
regulation . . . rule (i) clearly applies to the facts of this case,”114 and “[o]ur 
reading of the language of . . . Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 and the 
consistent administrative interpretation of the phrase ‘highest price charged 
during March, 1942’ . . . compel the conclusion” respecting the meaning of 
the rule.115  Professor Aditya Bamzai reports that the original draft of the 
opinion declared that the Court’s reading was “compelled” by the “plain 
 
 106. See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413. 
 107. See id. at 414–15. 
 108. See id. at 412–13. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 412. 
 111. See id. at 415. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. at 412–13. 
 114. See id. at 415 (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. at 418 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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words” of the regulation, an even more clearly nondeferential statement than 
appeared in the Court’s published opinion.116 
If any reasonable administrative construction sufficed, as the opinion 
asserts in passing (in the quotation that became the Auer test), the Court 
would not have needed to emphasize that construction’s accord with the 
Court’s own interpretation of the rule—much less present its interpretation 
before any discussion of reasons to credit the agency’s reading.  In a very 
short opinion that is noted for its articulation of a principle of judicial 
deference, the number of statements indicating that the Court is construing 
the regulation directly, not deferentially, is striking.117  To be sure, the Court 
did specifically note the fact that its reading of the regulation was the same 
as the agency’s reading and that the agency had construed the regulation 
consistently in this manner.118  But these observations seem less prerequisites 
to the Court’s decision than window dressing to its independent reading of 
the rule.119 
Basing the decision on its own reading of the regulation, just as it would a 
decision on the meaning of a law, also fit the arguments made by the agency.  
Professor Bamzai recounts that the brief filed for OPA by Henry Hart 
(working at OPA on leave from his teaching post) urged that the Court should 
construe the rule like it would a statute and should look to the intention of 
the rule’s author—in this case, the agency.120  Hart argued that this was also 
a reason for deference, as the Administrator of OPA would have special 
insight on the intent of the rule.121 
More tellingly, Hart’s special plea was that the construction of the rule 
urged by the agency fit with extrinsic evidence that this was the correct 
interpretation, and he noted that this construction was not advanced for the 
first time in litigation but instead had been followed by the agency 
consistently since the regulation’s adoption.122  That provided evidence of 
the agency’s understanding of the rule and at least inferential evidence of 
what those subject to the rule would have understood it to mean (assuming 
that they had access to the agency’s interpretation). 
3.  Deference Defended:  Seminole Rock’s Special Case 
On this last point, Seminole Rock presents the most compelling factual 
basis for deference:  as the Court’s decision relates, OPA had not only 
adopted its reading of the rule contemporaneously with the rule’s 
 
 116. See Aditya Bamzai, Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole 
Rock Opinion, NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 12, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/ 
henry-harts-brief-frank-murphys-draft-and-the-seminole-rock-opinion-by-aditya-bamzai/ 
[https://perma.cc/CLR4-DTWQ]. 
 117. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 639; Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 60; 
Manning, supra note 10, at 619; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1454. 
 118. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 418. 
 119. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 639. 
 120. See Bamzai, supra note 116. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
550 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
promulgation, it had announced and publicly disseminated its interpretation 
at the same time and in the same place as its public notifications about the 
underlying rule.123  This is the functional equivalent of having made the 
agency interpretation part of the rule itself.  Viewed in this way, reliance on 
the agency’s interpretation simply gives effect to the rule as adopted.  At that 
point, any question of agency authority collapses into the inquiry 
encapsulated in the APA and original Chevron:  Was the rule within the scope 
of the agency’s authority under law? 
Seminole Rock’s peculiar context offers reasons why the Court may have 
been willing to defer to OPA’s interpretation.  First, the case arose during 
wartime and the decision at issue was part of a wartime measure to constrain 
prices.  Historically, government actions linked to engagement in war have 
received greater deference—at least while the war is ongoing—than 
peacetime measures.124  Second, deference to administrative interpretations 
of price-control rules often was seen as constraining, rather than expanding, 
administrative authority, as judicial adoption of prior constructions of a rule 
served to bind the agency in future applications.125 
These factors could help explain the Court’s uncritical acceptance of a 
broadly stated rule of deference.  However, the overwhelming reasons for its 
embrace of the Administrator’s interpretation of the rule are its consistency 
with the justices’ own reading combined with the simultaneous 
announcement of the interpretation and adoption of the regulation, its 
widespread and contemporaneous dissemination, and its consistent 
application.  The Court obviously would have reached the same result in 
Seminole Rock with or without deference.126  That, together with the peculiar 
facts of the case supporting deference, severely limit the credence that should 
be given to the Court’s broadly stated deference rule. 
4.  Here’s to You, Mr. Robertson 
The other case relied on to support Auer’s sweeping deference rule was 
the Court’s decision in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, forty 
years after Seminole Rock.127  The Auer Court did not really rely on 
Robertson as much more than a carrier bringing Seminole Rock’s rule closer 
in time.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Robertson, like Seminole Rock, 
plainly reads as a decision based on the Court’s own reading of the law, not 
on deference to administrative interpretation. 
 
 123. See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417. 
 124. See, e.g., Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 59–60; Nathaniel L. Nathanson, 
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942:  Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review, 9 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 60, 61–62 (1942); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 607 (2003).  See generally Donald H. 
Wallace & Philip H. Coomes, Economic Considerations in Establishing Maximum Prices in 
Wartime, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1942). 
 125. See, e.g., Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 55–58; Norem, supra note 104, at 
702–04. 
 126. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 639. 
 127. 490 U.S. 332 (1989). 
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Robertson primarily concerns issues of statutory interpretation relating to 
the National Environmental Protection Act’s (NEPA)128 meaning.  The Court 
painstakingly reviews the language of NEPA, its purposes, precedents 
respecting its application, and the steps taken by the Forest Service to 
implement it, in deciding whether the Service’s NEPA-mandated 
“Environmental Impact Statement” sufficiently detailed plans for mitigating 
environmental effects from allowing recreational uses of certain lands under 
its control.129 
Of the twenty-three pages covered by the opinions in the case, only two 
pages address the related contention that the Forest Service also violated its 
own regulations by failing to adopt a detailed mitigation plan.130  Justice John 
Paul Stevens’s opinion for the Court explains the nature of the mitigation 
steps proposed; rejects the contention that these steps are inadequately 
detailed, at least with respect to environmental effects pertaining directly to 
the site to be occupied and the entities using the site; and also declares that 
nothing in the Forest Service rule should be read to require advance detailed 
plans for mitigation of other effects.131  The final two sentences at the end of 
this examination declare that the Service did not behave unreasonably in 
interpreting its regulation to permit that result and add the quotation from 
Seminole Rock that an agency interpretation that is not “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation” is controlling.132  As with Seminole Rock, 
that addition was unnecessary to the Court’s conclusion. 
In short, neither Seminole Rock nor Robertson turned on—and neither 
required—the deference rule these decisions bequeathed to the Auer Court. 
III.  DEFERENCE, DELEGATION, AND AUER 
The rule announced in Auer, and before that in Seminole Rock and 
Robertson, was not just unnecessary to deciding those cases; it also lacks the 
implicit connection to constitutional-structural imperatives that explain 
Chevron and its eponymous test, at least in its original form.  Examination of 
the difference between the underpinnings of Auer and Chevron reveals the 
real deficit of Auer’s rule. 
A.  Deference from Legislative Delegation 
As explained in Part I and underscored at the beginning of Part II, 
deference follows delegation.  Deference to administrative decisions is not—
or at least should not be—predicated on judicial assessment of judges’ 
competence versus administrators’ capabilities with respect to a given 
 
 128. Id. at 336. 
 129. See id. at 336–56.  The Court also considered the application of regulations from the 
Council on Environmental Quality implementing NEPA requirements. Id. at 351–56.  That 
agency’s actions were not at issue in the question respecting deference to the Forest Service’s 
interpretation of its own rule. 
 130. See id. at 357–59. 
 131. See id. at 357–58. 
 132. See id. at 359. 
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decision.133  It should not flow from a sense that administrators will do a 
good—or good enough—job at interpreting the law.134  Deference should not 
be accorded to administrative judgments because administrators are more 
responsive to political influence or more democratically accountable.135 
Each of these considerations may be relevant to issues of governmental 
design or academic reflection on its benefits, but these are not issues given 
to the courts for free-form resolution.  Instead, the essence of constitutional 
construction is the assignment of functions to each level and branch of 
government, dividing responsibility between federal and state governments 
and among the three branches of the federal government.136  Courts properly 
give deference to administrative decisions only when, and only so far as, 
either constitutional or statutory provisions confer discretion on the president 
or his subordinates.137 
This limitation on deference to instances of legally conferred discretion, 
as identified through judicial interpretations of governing legal texts, does 
not necessarily justify Chevron’s canon on construing statutory silence or 
ambiguity.  Justice Stephen Breyer has argued often that silence or ambiguity 
alone is insufficient to indicate legislative commitment of a matter to 
executive discretion,138 and Justice Clarence Thomas has expressed strong 
concern that the courts have been abdicating their constitutional duties 
through excessive deference.139 
Yet, Chevron’s canon, at least as initially presented, anchors deference in 
a construction of statutory text that looks to the parameters of legislative 
delegation.  Agencies were to receive deference so far, and only so far, as 
statutory commitments of authority are framed in ways consistent with that 
 
 133. But see, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 18, at 94. 
 134. But see, e.g., Diver, supra note 18, at 582–92. 
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Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1447–56 (2017); Cass, supra note 25, at 57–58; 
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59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 712–13 (2007); Scalia, supra note 25, at 513–16; see also PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 4–8 (2014); Byse, supra note 25, at 262–
65. 
 138. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308–12 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of 
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986). 
 139. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–53 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing broad concerns over judicial failures to 
police lines between constitutionally vested powers); Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1217–20 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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result.140  Chevron combined that notion with the observation that statutory 
delegations of authority in broad, ambiguous, or incomplete instructions may 
often be consistent with an implicit understanding that this confers additional 
degrees of discretion beyond what a narrower, more focused, or more fully 
articulated instruction would convey.141 
B.  Deference Without Delegation or Two-Level Delegation? 
This Part takes up the questions that follow any effort to connect Auer to 
Chevron.  It asks, first, whether there could be a delegation-based explanation 
for deference to agency rule interpretation.  Second, after exploring the 
concept of two-level delegation, it also asks how a statutory commitment of 
discretionary authority to administrators could encompass both rule writing 
and rule interpretation. 
1.  Non-Chevron Deference 
Auer’s rule is markedly different from Chevron’s at its core.  Whether it is 
sensible in a given instance to read statutory ambiguity or silence as 
indicating a legislative commitment of discretionary authority to another 
branch can be debated.142 
However, it is not open for debate how the statutory construction canon 
reads in Auer’s context.  Simply put, one cannot infer a congressional 
delegation of discretionary authority to an agency from silence or ambiguity 
in a rule adopted by the agency itself. 
Moreover, an agency cannot delegate additional authority to itself.  It 
cannot create authority it otherwise lacked by adopting ambiguous or 
incomplete regulations or conferring discretion on itself to interpret and 
apply them as it sees fit.  Contrary to a common assumption of the similarity 
between Auer deference and Chevron deference,143 in the most crucial aspect 
of deference as a corollary of delegated discretion, there can be no rule of 
deference to agency decisions respecting agency rules that mirrors Chevron. 
 
 140. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 141. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1995); Cass, supra 
note 25, at 68–69; Scalia, supra note 25, at 520–21; see also supra notes 35–36, 78–81 and 
accompanying text (discussing FCC spectrum allocation and licensing authority). 
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Chevron and Chevron in practice. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, 
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note 75; Pierce, supra note 75. 
 143. See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1454–58 (discussing and 
criticizing common rationales for strong judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulation); see also Healy, supra note 8, at 644–45, 649–51, 653–56 (discussing and 
criticizing simple analogies of rationales for deference in Auer’s settings to reasons for 
deference in Chevron-type settings). 
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2.  Finding Two-Level Delegation 
This does not mean that there is no possible delegation-based explanation 
for deference to agency rule interpretation.  A statutory commitment of 
discretionary authority to an administrator could encompass not only rule 
writing but rule interpretation as well.144 
Look back, for example, at the sort of discretion recognized in Webster v. 
Doe and Chaney.145  Although both decisions concerned the exercise of 
statutory discretion rather than rule interpretation, the deference appropriate 
to the decision of the director of the CIA in Webster v. Doe or the FDA 
Administrator in Chaney would have been identical if either administrator 
had first adopted a rule to guide his exercise of discretion.  Certainly, in 
Justice Scalia’s and Justice O’Connor’s view, the statutes in each case, read 
in light of the sorts of decisions at issue—in Webster v. Doe, personnel 
decisions made in the context of national security concerns that the CIA 
director was peculiarly well-positioned to understand and, in Chaney, 
decisions respecting when to institute enforcement activity, a matter within 
the understood discretion of the FDA—committed unreviewable discretion 
to the administrators.146  Whether they exercised that discretion through case-
by-case decisions without prior guidance or through decisions guided by a 
prior rule should not matter. 
The Webster v. Doe and Chaney decisions were predicated on notions of 
delegation and separation of powers that combined functional and textual 
approaches to drawing the line between what is committed to agencies and 
what is within the purview of judges.  Yet, the heart of the matter for 
Chaney—and for Justice Scalia, at least, in Webster v. Doe—was the scope 
of statutorily delegated discretionary authority (and the concomitant 
limitations on judicial review).  In the same vein, courts have sought to 
determine the scope of discretion to interpret regulations reasonably 
associated with statutory enactments and, thus, the deference owed from 
courts.147 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Martin v. Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission148 and Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,149 for 
instance, followed this route to find statutory grants of discretion for 
interpretation of regulations.  In both cases, the Court anchored deference to 
agency reading of regulations in the underlying congressional delegation of 
responsibility over the subjects at issue. 
 
 144. For various visions of what such deference might entail, see, for example, Healy, 
supra note 8, at 653–57; Manning, supra note 10, at 623; Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting 
Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 365 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The 
Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 306–08 (2017).  For another example, 
see generally Monaghan, supra note 83. 
 145. See supra notes 37–56 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608–10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–38 (1985). 
 147. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 650–57. 
 148. 499 U.S. 144 (1991). 
 149. 501 U.S. 680 (1991). 
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The Martin decision begins its analysis with a broad statement of the 
reason to think that statutes’ commitment of policy discretion to agencies 
often will encompass a degree of freedom to interpret rules:  “Because 
applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls 
upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we 
presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a 
component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”150  After 
examining the specific provisions and statements respecting the particular 
division of authority between the Secretary of Labor, who enjoys rulemaking 
and enforcement authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSH Act), and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 
which reviews departmental decisions under the Act, the Court said: 
We conclude from the available indicia of legislative intent that Congress 
did not intend to sever the power authoritatively to interpret OSH Act 
regulations from the Secretary’s power to promulgate and enforce them. 
 . . . The Secretary’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is 
subject to the same standard of substantive review as any other exercise of 
delegated lawmaking power.151 
Similarly, the BethEnergy decision, addressing the Secretary of Labor’s 
authority under the Black Lung Benefits Act, restates the Court’s prior 
observation that the prerequisite for deference under Chevron is the 
delegation of authority to an administrative agency, particularly 
policymaking authority.152  It then declares that “[a]s delegated by Congress, 
then, the Secretary[ of Labor]’s authority to promulgate regulations ‘not . . . 
more restrictive than’ the [rules adopted by the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW)] interim regulations necessarily entails the 
authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and the discretion to promulgate” 
new regulations based on a reasonable interpretation of what HEW’s rules 
meant.153  Without that authority, it would have been difficult to see what 
rulemaking discretion Congress could have accorded the Department of 
Labor under the revised legal framework for combatting black lung disease 
and compensating its victims.154 
C.  Limited Support for Expanded Delegation-Based Deference 
That a case can be made for supporting expanded delegation-based 
deference in some settings is far from persuasive support for a broad 
deference rule.  This Part explains why values that may provide justification 
for the assignment of certain decisions to administrative agencies do not 
 
 150. Martin, 499 U.S. at 151. 
 151. Id. at 157–58. 
 152. BethEnergy, 501 U.S. at 696–97 (citing Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 
(1990)). 
 153. Id. at 698. 
 154. Indeed, Justice Scalia, dissenting, pointed out the difficulty with reading the law as 
conferring any discretion on this score to the secretary. See id. at 707–13 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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justify the assumption that all statutory ambiguity indicates a legislative 
commitment of policymaking discretion to administrators. 
1.  Supporting Expanded Deference 
Martin and BethEnergy are consistent with finding a two-level delegation 
of authority from Congress, as each decision references a possible statutory 
basis for deference to rule interpretations that could overcome the basic 
approach of the APA.  However, neither decision rests its conclusion on a 
compelling, straightforward reading of the law as delegating the sort of 
discretion for interpretation of rules that the Court finds.  Both cases blend 
apparent assumptions that Chevron deference automatically extends to rule 
interpretation with more careful explanations as to why the underlying 
legislative scheme is consistent with that result.  Justice Harry Blackmun’s 
opinion for the Court in BethEnergy, for instance, moves directly from 
recapitulating the bases for Chevron deference in reviewing administrative 
regulations to the assertion that the same considerations necessarily apply to 
the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of already adopted rules in 
BethEnergy (rules adopted a decade earlier by a different agency).155 
Despite questions about the explanations in those cases, the instinct behind 
Martin and BethEnergy is sound.  When conferring authority on an agency 
to exercise judgment on matters for which special expertise or experience is 
critical, Congress certainly can grant administrators discretion (at least within 
the parameters of constitutional permit).156  Technical, scientific, or 
experiential judgments inform not only the way agencies frame regulations, 
but the way they interpret and apply them as well.157  The same is true for 
policy determinations calling on judgments about the best use of agency 
resources or the best route to implement enforcement activities of the sort at 
issue in Chaney.158  It is true as well for decisions necessarily based in 
information that cannot be widely disclosed, as with the national security 
considerations implicated in Webster v. Doe. 
Assignment of these decisions to administrative discretion can be defended 
in particular cases on the efficiency or democratic-legitimacy values 
frequently used to justify broad delegations of authority to administrators.159  
Those are the values often claimed to provide justification for Chevron 
deference.160  Even Chevron skeptics admit that those values often align with 
construction of particular statutes as delegating authority to administrators 
 
 155. See id. at 696–99. 
 156. For a discussion of constitutional limitations on delegation, see infra Part III.F.2. 
 157. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 83, at 736–37, 739–41. 
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HAMBURGER, supra note 137, at 4, 83–110. 
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SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); Diver, supra note 18; Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 18; 
Mashaw, supra note 18; Pierce, supra note 18. 
 160. See generally, e.g., Breyer, supra note 138; Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 18; 
Pierce, supra note 75; Pierce, supra note 18; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 144. 
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and with the further inference that statutory silence or ambiguity is consistent 
with delegation of discretionary authority for specific administrative officials 
to make decisions within the confines of the law.161 
Those same values can cohere with statutory construction of delegated 
discretionary authority over interpretation and implementation of rules.  The 
authority granted, for example, to the OPA Administrator in Seminole Rock, 
is consistent with deference to determinations respecting the application of 
the rule.  Put aside the fact that the Court actually construed the law and 
rule.162  If finding delegated discretion over the issue had mattered, this was 
the perfect case for it.  The issue was technical, the grant of authority over 
prices was a wartime enactment (limited to and applied during wartime), and 
experience in the assessment of contracts and pricing arrangements in a 
particular line of business framed the interpretive issue in the case.163 
In addition, the textual bases for deference in Seminole Rock lined up with 
other considerations that have supported deference.  The position taken was 
one of long-standing, consistent application, starting contemporaneously 
with adoption of the rule being construed, and not a “‘convenient litigating 
position,’ or a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced . . . to defend past agency 
action against attack.”164 
2.  Requirements for Finding Deference-Worthy Delegation 
Although prodelegation values can buttress a reading of the law in specific 
instances, such as the Price Control Act’s provision at issue in Seminole 
Rock, as conferring discretion to implement rules, those values do not justify 
an assumption that every statutory ambiguity signals a legislative 
commitment of policymaking discretion to administrators to resolve the 
ambiguity.  That is not an adequate basis for construing statutes generally as 
granting first-level delegations of broad rulemaking authority, and certainly 
not an adequate basis for assuming that vague regulatory laws routinely 
comprehend second-level delegations of discretionary rule-implementing 
authority. 
The Supreme Court’s “extraordinary case” or “major questions” canon of 
statutory construction, as announced in FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Co.,165 rightly makes that point as a matter of first-level delegation: 
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Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it 
administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes 
an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory 
gaps.  In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate 
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit 
delegation.166 
Justice Scalia captured the same point more pithily in pointing out that 
Congress was not likely to make major changes in the law surreptitiously.  
That would have been the case if it were found to have delegated authority 
to the FDA broadly to restrict sales of tobacco products (the issue in Brown 
& Williamson) or to have delegated to the EPA broad discretion to weigh the 
costs and benefits of ozone regulation and make determinations respecting 
its permissibility on that basis (the issue in Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns167).  Writing for the Court in American Trucking, Scalia said:  
“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme 
in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide 
elephants in mouseholes.”168 
More generally, as already noted, justices on the Supreme Court—at times 
a majority—have expressed strong concern about the breadth of the Chevron 
assumption of delegated discretion (as it is applied).  In addition to Justice 
Thomas’s expansive objection to the Court’s abdication of their 
constitutional responsibilities to interpret and apply legal texts that govern 
resolution of the disputes before them,169 other justices—including Justices 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer (among the eight-justice majority in United 
States v. Mead Corp.170)—have supported requirements for deference that 
demand additional indicia that Congress, enacting the relevant law, plausibly 
committed discretionary authority consistent with deference.171  In addition, 
Justices Kennedy and Alito joined with Chief Justice Roberts (dissenting in 
City of Arlington v. FCC172) in arguing against deference to decisions on 
 
 166. Id. at 159. 
 167. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 168. Id. at 468. 
 169. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, 
J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217–20 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment); cf. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 
1240–53 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing concerns respecting 
abdication of the Court’s responsibility to assure that constitutionally vested powers are not 
delegated to or assumed by entities that are not authorized to exercise them). 
 170. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 171. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
1003–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218–20 (2002); 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230–34; Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000).  
In Christensen, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, limited the types of administrative 
pronouncements qualifying for Chevron deference, an approach later reconfirmed in Mead.  
For discussion of the differences among the approaches of the justices and cases on this score, 
see, for example, Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 
536–47 (2014). 
 172. 569 U.S. 290 (2013). 
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agency jurisdiction.173  Although the majority in City of Arlington embraced 
Justice Scalia’s skepticism about courts’ ability to separate “jurisdictional” 
questions from other issues of statutory authority,174 the majority plainly also 
had doubts about the wisdom of assuming that Chevron deference should 
apply whenever imprecise or incomplete statutory language could be 
construed to grant administrators’ discretion.175 
The justices’ skepticism over the application of Chevron is doubly 
problematic for Auer deference.  If something more than silence or ambiguity 
is needed to ground an inference that Congress has conferred deference-
worthy discretion for agency rulemaking, it plainly follows that even more is 
required to support a second level of deference to the agency’s interpretation 
of its rule.176 
D.  Auer Deference’s Due Process Problems 
In light of the preceding discussion, the underlying requirement for 
deference to agency interpretations of agency rules, at a minimum, should be 
some meaningful basis for concluding that Congress has in fact delegated 
discretion over that determination to the agency.  That minimum 
requirement, however, may not be enough.  This section and the succeeding 
section explore reasons for questioning the legitimacy of actual delegations 
of authority over both rulemaking and rule interpretation or rule application. 
Scholarly and judicial commentary has offered two principal reasons—
apart from logical inferences from the reservations discussed above 
respecting broad application of “Chevronesque” deference—for concern 
over deferring to agency rule interpretation even if there is evidence of a 
congressional commitment of such authority.177  These are:  (1) the conflict 
between deference and structural or due process considerations respecting 
 
 173. See id. at 312–23 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 174. See id. at 306 (majority opinion). 
 175. For data consistent with observations of the justices’ statements and decisions, see 
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 82, at 1130–35 and see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 
F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Judge (now-Justice) Gorsuch, 
in addition to writing the opinion for the court, wrote separately to express concern over the 
Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence in terms that evoked considerations voiced by Justice 
Thomas. 
 176. See, e.g., Professors’ Brief, supra note 102, at 16–17.  A similar point is suggested by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas in their concurrences in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, which 
both noted the tension between the APA and deference to administrative rule interpretations 
accomplished without notice-and-comment rulemaking. See 135 S. Ct. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice 
Thomas presents an even more basic objection to any deference:  that it is an invasion of the 
judicial role. See id. at 1224; see also infra Part III.E.2.  But see Nielson, Beyond, supra note 
8, at 964–82 (noting the availability of interpretation through adjudication as an alternative to 
interpretive rulemaking). 
 177. Professor Walker has suggested that there are at least four significant arguments for 
narrowing the scope of Auer deference. See Walker, supra note 8, at 107–10.  The arguments 
collected under this heading in his helpful review, however, include both analytical rationales 
for Auer’s impropriety or illegality and proposed strategies for altering the deference doctrine 
to limit problems associated with Auer deference. 
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impartial adjudication; and (2) the conflict between deference and due 
process considerations respecting fair notice.  Both of these arguments 
encompass suppositions about strategic behavior by agency officials as well 
as analysis of appropriate procedures for applying rules. 
1.  Impartial Adjudication:  Can the Rule Writer Decide? 
The best-known challenge to Auer deference—although in fact pitched at 
Seminole Rock, as it was published prior to the decision in Auer—is Professor 
John Manning’s elaboration of a separation-of-powers concern which can 
also be cast as a due process concern rooted in the requirement of an impartial 
adjudicator.178  His article recalls the ideas, articulated by writers such as 
Montesquieu, Locke, and Blackstone, that informed the framing of our 
Constitution, particularly concerns with the aggregation of different powers 
in one official or governmental body.179 
Those concerns largely explain the division of powers in the national 
government, separating lawmaking from law-interpretation and law-
implementation functions.  The Vesting Clauses of the Constitution make 
clear that Congress is responsible for making law, the executive branch for 
implementing it, and courts for interpreting it as necessary to its application 
in cases properly brought before them.180  While this oversimplifies a bit—
for example, the president participates in lawmaking through the requirement 
of presentment and in some respects is empowered to take action in areas of 
national security and international affairs even in the absence of specific 
legislation181—it is a fair picture of the overall constitutional design. 
Further, because the Constitution’s framers had special concerns over 
lawmaking authority, the Constitution imposes onerous requirements on how 
laws are made.182  They divided legislative power between two houses of 
Congress with members chosen in different ways, at different times, for 
different-length terms, representing differently composed constituencies, and 
 
 178. See generally Manning, supra note 10, at 631–54. 
 179. See id. at 640–48. 
 180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.  The degree 
to which conclusions about the scope of the powers delegated to each branch can be drawn 
strictly from the Vesting Clauses is contested.  Some scholars draw strong conclusions from 
the Vesting Clauses themselves. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE:  TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 22–43 
(2004); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 
(1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).  Others, however, contest those conclusions. See generally, 
e.g., Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 467 (2011); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004).  Nonetheless, the argument for understanding 
them as actually dividing powers is overwhelming. 
 181. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
946–48 (1983); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936). 
 182. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–51 (James Madison). 
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required bicameral agreement along with presentment of legislation to the 
president for acceptance or veto.183 
Yet, Professor Manning notes, Congress has effectively delegated 
lawmaking power to administrators.  As Manning frames it, Congress has 
“delegated authority that gives agencies the right to promulgate statute-like 
‘legislative rules’ under exceptionally open-ended statutory standards.”184  
The result is that “important and binding specifics of legislation are defined 
not through bicameralism and presentment, but through executive 
policymaking, which occurs apart from the legislative process.”185 
Because separation-of-powers considerations demand that law-
interpretation and law-implementation powers be divided from lawmaking, 
Manning concludes that the exercise of lawmaking power by administrators 
requires that administrators not enjoy the sort of control over interpretation 
and implementation that the rule of Seminole Rock (and later Auer) grants.186  
The combination of powers not only violates concerns that generally limit 
officials to one type of power; it also provides incentives for officials to 
augment their power through strategic behavior.187  Although officials will 
not always want to adopt vague rules to preserve interpretive freedom 
(doubtless wanting at times to bind successors), they will be more inclined to 
choose imprecision than would have been the case without Auer 
deference.188 
Although Professor Manning’s critique is thoughtful and influential—it 
has been picked up by others, notably by Justice Scalia189—it is too general 
a response to Seminole Rock’s (and, more, Auer’s) flaws.  First, while 
logically Auer’s rule applies only to legislative-type rules, like Mead, it is not 
limited to instances where agency rules have the force of law.190  Second, 
and more significantly, some rules that do have the force of law do not give 
rise to concerns about interpretation of the sort Manning identified.  They do 
not, that is, present likely difficulties with inappropriate expansion of 
administrative power or likely inclination of interpretations toward results 
that prejudice individuals or entities affected by agency rules. 
 
 183. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 7; THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), 
NOS. 48, 51 (James Madison). 
 184. Manning, supra note 10, at 652–53. 
 185. Id. at 653. 
 186. See id. at 654–57. 
 187. See id. at 659–60, 664–69. 
 188. See id. at 655–56, 659–60, 663–64. 
 189. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–23 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 
564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 190. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997); see also Christensen v. Harris 
Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 589–91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); Michael Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux:  Mead and the Shrinking Domain 
of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 579–80 (2002); Hickman, supra note 171, at 
533; Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:  Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 352 
(2003). 
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On the latter point, it is helpful to start with the more general question of 
combination of functions.  Justice Scalia rightly observed in his dissenting 
opinion in Mistretta v. United States191—which considered a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission—that 
administrators frequently are assigned functions that look very much like 
adjudication or legislation, but that either of those functions is appropriately 
assigned to administrators only as an adjunct of some executive function.192  
In other words, the constitutional basis for administrators to engage in either 
legislative-type rulemaking or court-like functions of interpretation and 
dispute resolution must be the combination of one of these functions with 
another function squarely in the executive’s domain. 
In the same vein, James Madison recognized during the debates on 
constitutional ratification that the division of authority over the three types 
of power assigned to the three branches by the Vesting Clauses cannot be 
perfectly captured by any verbal formula, or entirely separated among the 
departments.193  Further, he defended the blending of functions in spots—as, 
for example, with the president’s involvement in lawmaking or the Senate’s 
participation in official appointments—as providing a salutary check on 
excessive discretionary power in one branch of government.194 
Professor Manning’s argument, in line with the arguments from Madison 
and Scalia—and despite Manning’s invocation of more general separation-
of-powers arguments from philosophers—does not challenge all 
combinations of functions as violating separation-of-powers strictures.  
Instead, his more limited challenge to combining functions asserts that 
allowing a rule writer to interpret rules is problematic because it 
compromises the impartiality ideally required of interpreters and, 
consequently, the incentives to be clear in the rules as well.195 
Yet, even some combinations of exactly this sort seem unobjectionable.  
As noted above, Seminole Rock is an example of facts that made it reasonable 
to interpret the underlying law (the Price Control Act of 1942) as granting a 
second level of discretion.196  The interpretive question at issue was narrow, 
technical, and affected by experience associated with the work of the Office 
of Price Administration.197  The issue also was one on which there was no 
reason to expect the administrative decision makers to have a bias that would 
call their interpretation into question—which among the alternative methods 
for calculation of the price comparator was appropriate for the crushed stone 
contracts and how the spacing of sales and delivery fit OPA’s rule were not 
matters on which OPA should have been seen as an unfit umpire. 
The same is true for some of the technical questions respecting appropriate 
frequency separation, acceptable degrees of frequency overlap and signal 
 
 191. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 192. See id. at 413, 417–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 193. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 37, 47–51 (James Madison). 
 194. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–48, 51 (James Madison). 
 195. See Manning, supra note 10, at 647–48. 
 196. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 197. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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attenuation, and other items that were important to early decisions on 
spectrum allocation by the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and FCC.198  
Although important policy considerations were (perhaps wrongly) delegated 
to administrators,199 there is no reason to expect that decisions on technical 
issues were biased or that the FRC or FCC used interpretive judgments on 
that portion of agency authority to expand their power or to prejudice 
individual rights.200  Insofar as the concern is with biased interpretations, the 
circumstances here, as in the Seminole Rock example, do not lend credence 
to that basis for rejecting deference. 
Ultimately, Professor Manning’s article presents a thoughtful objection to 
the Seminole Rock-Auer doctrine, but the objection is sufficiently broad that 
it must be judged an incomplete guide to when Congress should be able to 
delegate second-level discretionary authority. 
2.  Fair Notice:  Strategy and Due Process Concerns 
A second objection to Auer deference, even for instances in which 
legislation is consistent with a second level of deference to administrative 
determinations, focuses on the opportunity that deference provides for 
decisions that unfairly surprise those affected by a rule’s interpretation.  This 
concern has been voiced, for instance, by several justices.  Justice Samuel 
Alito, writing for a five-justice majority in Christopher v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp.,201 refused to grant Auer deference on the ground that the 
Department of Labor had changed position after the grant of certiorari in a 
manner that failed to give fair notice of the new interpretation of its rule: 
[T]he DOL’s interpretation of ambiguous regulations [would] impose 
potentially massive liability on respondent for conduct that occurred well 
before that interpretation was announced.  To defer to the agency’s 
interpretation in this circumstance would seriously undermine the principle 
that agencies should provide regulated parties “fair warning of the conduct 
 
 198. On the nature of early radio allocation and licensing decisions, see generally, 1 ERIK 
BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL:  A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1966). 
 199. See generally, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1959); Thomas Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast 
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990); Glen O. Robinson, Radio Spectrum Regulation:  The 
Administrative Process and the Problems of Institutional Reform, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1179 
(1969). 
 200. In this regard, technical judgments by the administrators stand in marked contrast to 
their manipulation of other considerations on frequency allocation and licensing. See, e.g., 
RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER, JACK M. BEERMANN & JODY FREEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 861–72 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing the Cowles saga). See 
generally, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users:  Why 
Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998); Glen O. Robinson, 
The Federal Communications Commission:  An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. 
REV. 169 (1978). 
 201. 567 U.S. 142 (2012). 
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[a regulation] prohibits or requires.”  Indeed, it would result in precisely the 
kind of “unfair surprise” against which our cases have long warned.202 
Although the Court subsequently made clear in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n203 that concerns over unfair surprise did not justify imposition of new 
procedural requirements on agency interpretive statements, the justices also 
reserved the prospect of using that consideration as a freestanding basis for 
rejecting Auer deference in specific cases, as it had in Christopher.204 
Concerns that Auer deference might permit unfair surprise through 
changes in interpretation have been linked to assumptions that administrators 
might consciously introduce ambiguity in their regulations to increase the 
ambit of their own interpretive authority.205  This argument includes 
apprehension that administrators could manipulate the content of rules in 
ways that elide statutory controls over process (such as generally applicable 
APA requirements) and prejudice those who deal with agencies.206 
In this vein, Justice Thomas, for example, observed that allowing “an 
agency to issue vague regulations . . . maximizes agency power and allows 
the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than 
through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”207  Similarly, Justice 
Alito, citing Justice Scalia, declared that Auer deference “creates a risk that 
agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that they can 
later interpret as they see fit, thereby ‘frustrat[ing] the notice and 
predictability purposes of rulemaking.’”208  Justice Scalia also opined that 
giving deference to agency interpretations “allows the agency to control the 
extent of its notice-and-comment-free domain,” adding that “[t]he APA does 
not remotely contemplate this regime.”209 
The fear that administrators, aware of Auer’s import, will purposely frame 
substantive rules in vague terms to expand opportunities for discretionary 
judgment later on is easily overstated.  Political appointees, who generally 
have decision-making authority on such things, most often have a decidedly 
 
 202. Id. at 155–56 (2012) (citations omitted) (first quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986); then 
citing Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007)).  Justice Breyer, 
joined in dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, did not engage the point about 
Auer deference directly but found the agency’s interpretation of its regulation consistent with 
the statute and with several prior statements about the nature of certain sales and promotion 
activities (points that related to the interpretive question at issue). See id. at 169–78 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 203. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
 204. See id. at 1209; Christopher, 567 U.S. at 157–60. See generally Leading Case, 
Administrative Procedure Act—Changing Interpretive Rules—Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n, 129 HARV. L. REV. 291 (2015). 
 205. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 15, at 11–12; Manning, supra note 10, at 647–48, 655–
57; Nielson, Beyond, supra note 8, at 954; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1485–
86. 
 206. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 15, at 4–12. 
 207. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 208. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. 
Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 209. Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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limited time horizon, and the likelihood that successors soon will have a 
different view on policy issues severely diminishes incentives to leave much 
discretion to future interpretation.210 
Different incentives, of course, affect agency staff, who tend to be both 
more entrenched and more important to the details of agency decisions than 
often is recognized.211  This is the category of agency official most likely to 
be interested in preserving discretion for the future.212 
Even so, the impact of staff incentives is surely moderated by the 
incentives of politically appointed superiors.  Further, the prospect that 
agency rulemaking will respond more than marginally to incentive effects 
tied to rule writers’ appreciation of the legal rules on deference to agency rule 
interpretation itself is questionable.213  Although studies have found some 
degree of familiarity with deference rules, the relevant decision makers are 
apparently far more familiar with Chevron than Auer and far more likely to 
take account of the former in framing regulations.214 
Moreover, in contrast to the situation with legislation, there is relatively 
little likelihood that administrators will gain significant benefit from using 
opaque language to defer or mask politically difficult decisions.  Officials 
who run for elected office and who need support from diverse constituencies 
often have strong reasons to avoid clear statements of position.215  However, 
in general, ambiguity in administrative rules is apt to be the product of less 
clear appreciation of future problems or less clear focus on the meaning of 
words chosen than of deliberate attempts to preserve discretion for later 
decisions. 
Questions about the fit between use of interpretive guidance and APA 
rulemaking—often conjoined with arguments about Auer’s contribution to 
risks of abrupt shifts in agency positions without appropriate signaling to the 
public—are serious matters.  APA rulemaking requirements are designed to 
provide notice and to shape consideration of rules’ effects in ways that 
facilitate clearer drafting and better advance notice to the public than more 
 
 210. For similar points respecting administrators’ incentives regarding future agency 
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casual methods of decision-making associated with other vehicles for 
formulating and announcing interpretive judgments.216 
Use of other methods for providing guidance is certainly permitted, even 
when changing course on agency policy,217 but agencies at times change 
interpretations of legal requirements in ways that are neither well-grounded 
in legal texts nor accomplished in ways that are designed to provide adequate 
notice to affected individuals and entities.218  The Department of Education’s 
change in interpretation of a Title IX regulation respecting segregation of 
school bathroom and locker room facilities by sex—using a private letter 
ruling to dramatically alter a rule that was not ambiguous, some four decades 
after its adoption—provided a particularly striking example.219 
Certainly, when failure to utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking 
processes results in ill-considered judgments or interpretive shifts that lack 
sufficient signaling to those directly affected by agency rules, courts should 
(and do) have tools to prevent the most unfortunate effects of those 
procedural deficits.220  The issues relevant to these determinations, however, 
are not whether deference to agency interpretations for which there is 
delegated discretion is generally unlawful but whether specific 
determinations fail to meet legal requirements either of process or substance.  
The “fair notice” objection is apposite in particular instances, as it was in 
Christopher,221 and failure to meet APA requirements, absent an applicable 
statutory exception, would prevent a conclusion that there was in fact 
delegated discretion in a given setting. 
On balance, as with the objection predicated on combination-of-functions 
concerns, while the “fair notice” argument contains insights about the impact 
deference to administrative rule interpretation has on important values, it 
does not provide a basis for across-the-board rejection of a second level of 
deference to administrative decisions. 
E.  Auer’s Iterated Delegation Problem:  First Cuts 
The conclusion that Congress can delegate discretion over the 
implementation of law—including discretion over policy judgments framed 
by statute and determinations relevant to elaboration of policy judgments 
encapsulated in already-adopted rules—does not compel a conclusion that 
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(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). 
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Congress has, in any given instance, done so.  So, too, finding that neither of 
the two commonly voiced arguments against the constitutionality of 
delegating second-level discretionary authority can bear the weight 
advocates suggest for them does not mean that all delegations of second-level 
interpretive authority are constitutionally permissible. 
Thus, two remaining questions are:  When should courts find that a statute 
includes a delegation of second-level discretionary authority?  And, what 
principles limit congressional authority to make such delegations?  Both the 
institutional bias-partiality argument first advanced by Professor Manning 
and the fair notice argument articulated in Christopher provide partial 
answers to the second question.  As explained below, these arguments join 
more general concerns over delegation of authority to suggest answers to 
both of these questions. 
1.  Assumptions’ Insufficiency:  Ambiguity and Expertise 
Although the settings differ in important ways, the impulse Auer 
represented was the same as that underlying Chevron:  seeing an ambiguous, 
unclear, or incomplete statutory instruction as sufficient indication that 
Congress intended (and actually delegated authority for) administrators to 
resolve the ambiguity or complete the legislation reflects the same 
assumption about legislation.  It assumes that legislators knowingly arrive at 
compromises that fail fully to account for decisions that need to be made for 
laws to be effective and would prefer that those further decisions be made by 
officials who are more politically accountable instead of by judges, who are 
insulated against political influence.222  Even vigorous advocates of this 
supposition, however, have recognized that it is merely a fiction in respect of 
statutory ambiguity.223  How much more of a fiction would it have to be to 
suggest an intent to delegate a second level of discretionary authority? 
Further, while Justice Scalia, among others, for many years defended 
Chevron’s assumption that ambiguity in statutory commitment of authority 
to an agency carries with it discretionary authority within the domain of that 
ambiguity,224 he coupled that interpretive canon with a decided willingness 
to examine particular statutory language and pronounce its meaning, 
notwithstanding administrators’ opinions.225  This made Scalia’s version of 
Chevron closer than might otherwise appear to that of Justice Breyer and 
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other justices who demand particularized evidence of delegated discretion.226  
On either Scalia’s or Breyer’s vision of Chevron, quite a bit more than 
statutory ambiguity should be needed to support the extended discretion 
associated with Auer.227 
As with ambiguity alone, it should not suffice that the matter over which 
administrative discretion is claimed can be cast as technical, narrow, or best 
resolved by reference to experiences and analytical capabilities that lie more 
in administrators’ than in judges’ hands.  These factors make a delegation of 
discretionary authority less objectionable as a matter of policy,228 but they 
do not constitute evidence that the authorities who must make such a 
delegation—elected officials given power to frame legislation through 
specified constitutional mechanisms—have made that choice.229 
The legislature’s commitment of discretion over rule implementation is 
unlikely to be clearly formalized in an express statutory statement, although 
at times statutory language will come close to that, as it did in the provision 
of the National Security Act at issue in Webster v. Doe.230  Absent that, courts 
should demand something beyond a surmise that laws necessarily commit all 
technical questions or all experiential or complicated issues to 
administrators’ discretion.  Unusually broad legislative assignments of 
authority, such as those embodied in the FCC’s spectrum allocation 
authority231 or the Office of Price Administration’s authority underlying 
Seminole Rock, provide one indication.232  Matters historically treated as 
within the executive’s discretion—based in constitutional authorization (as 
with some national security decisions233) or in the sort of interrelated 
resource and policy considerations at issue in exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion234—also can support deference. 
The availability of indicia of deference in some instances, however, does 
not save, or even soften concerns over, Auer’s rule.  The gap between the 
general assumption of delegated discretion at the heart of Auer and the 
legitimate realm for fact-based conclusions respecting delegations of second-
 
 226. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308–10 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 
U.S. at 1003–04 (Breyer, J., concurring); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218–20 (2002); 
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 227. See, e.g., Professors’ Brief, supra note 102, at 12–20. 
 228. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 10, at 616–17; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 83, 
at 754 (arguing that administrative expertise should be the primary basis for granting 
deference).  See generally, e.g., Diver, supra note 18; Mashaw, supra note 18; Pierce, supra 
note 18. 
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Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL. 199, 222–23 (2000). 
 230. See supra notes 39–56 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–16 (1945). 
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level interpretive authority is fatal to Auer as written.  Moving beyond Auer 
to evidence-based assessments of delegation, construction of particular 
statutory commitments of second-level interpretive authority should be 
parsimonious—not only for the combination of functions and fair warning 
reasons discussed above235 but also because some delegations, even of a first 
level of discretionary authority, raise serious constitutional problems. 
2.  Deference as Unconstitutional Delegation of Judicial Power 
Justice Thomas has advanced one version of this argument, by asserting 
that any deference to administrative interpretation of either regulations or 
statutory requirements permits administrators to exercise judicial power 
constitutionally reserved to Article III judges.  Concurring in the judgment 
in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Thomas begins by reviewing the 
history, philosophical pedigree, importance, and constitutional embodiment 
of both separation of powers and interbranch checking principles.236  
Applying those principles from the Seminole Rock-Auer deference rule, he 
states: 
[T]he Judiciary, insulated from both internal and external sources of bias, 
is duty bound to exercise independent judgment in applying the law. 
 . . .  Just as it is critical for judges to exercise independent judgment in 
applying statutes, it is critical for judges to exercise independent judgment 
in determining that a regulation properly covers the conduct of regulated 
parties.  Defining the legal meaning of the regulation is one aspect of that 
determination. 
Seminole Rock deference, however, precludes judges from 
independently determining that meaning. . . .  That deference amounts to a 
transfer of the judge’s exercise of interpretive judgment to the agency.237 
Justice Thomas’s argument forcefully and appropriately articulates the 
tension between Auer’s expansive, general deference principle and principles 
underlying fundamental aspects of constitutional structure.  His “no 
deference” argument goes beyond the specific combination-of-functions 
contentions made by Professor Manning and the “fair notice” objection 
raised by others.238  Rather than anchoring his opposition to deference in 
notions of due process, Thomas’s claim rests on constitutional assignments 
of power and their relation to more basic concepts of liberty.  His argument 
recognizes that judicial review serves as a valuable check on abuse of 
legislative and executive power and links to other concerns that deference 
undermines important constitutional governance features.239 
 
 235. See supra Part III.D. 
 236. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–17 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 237. Id. at 1219. 
 238. See id. 
 239. For similar discussions regarding constitutional governance structures and separation 
of powers, see, for example, HAMBURGER, supra note 137, at 4–8, 334–45, 378–85; Byse, 
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The strong version of the “no deference” argument, however, conflicts 
with other aspects of a constitutional system that accepts—indeed, 
embraces—the blending of functions in some respects, on the one hand, and 
the mandated separation of powers, on the other.240  The federal courts have 
sole authority to exercise the judicial power of the United States, which 
encompasses “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, 
[and] Laws of the United States,”241 but that grant of power did not create 
specific causes of action in law or equity.242  For that reason, courts long 
have understood the Constitution as permitting assignments of decisional 
authority that are insulated from judicial scrutiny.  So, for example, cases 
such as Chaney and Webster v. Doe reveal reasons why Congress might 
properly, and constitutionally, delegate unreviewable discretion to 
administrators.243 
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court has recognized congressional 
prerogatives to shape the jurisdiction of federal courts, subject to a few 
limiting rules (such as the definition of the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction).244  The degree to which questions potentially within the federal 
judicial power can be put outside the reach of Article III courts—not through 
formal assignment to another body but through limited grants of jurisdiction 
to Article III courts—is contested, with thoughtful scholars expressing a 
range of divergent views.245  Despite differences over the exact extent to 
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which Congress is free to control federal courts’ jurisdiction, however, the 
strong consensus is that Congress’s control (at least as to the jurisdiction of 
lower courts) is extensive if not unlimited.  Restricting options for review by 
controlling the courts’ jurisdiction is essentially equivalent to granting 
unreviewable discretion in a world where federal courts otherwise enjoy 
general review authority over a set of questions respecting federal law—
which constitutes a broader delegation of authority to administrators than that 
assumed in deference rules. 
The same understanding of options for Congress by law to grant discretion 
to administrators beyond the purview of courts also underlies the Court’s 
second decision in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp. 
(Chenery II).246  Chenery II recognized administrators’ authority to make 
decisions that have retroactive effect without first adopting a general rule, 
much as common law courts’ decisions over time produce cognizable rules 
based on experience with concrete problems.247  The rule of Chenery II 
suggests that delegating unreviewable discretion is equally consistent with 
permitting case-by-case exercises of discretion as with exercise of discretion 
over rule-based policy choices.248 
It is also consistent with recognizing congressional power to confer a 
second level of discretionary authority, not just a single level, on 
administrators.  After all, if Congress can remove a category of decision from 
judicial review, then it can, in most circumstances, permit the discretion to 
be exercised as the legislators see fit (including through more expansive, 
more deferentially reviewed administrative authority over interpretation), 
which is a corollary of a legislatively delegated power.249  At least, 
constitutional objection to these delegations must be based on more than the 
manner in which deferring to exercises of discretion intrudes on the judicial 
power to “say what the law is.”250 
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Without taking anything away from its core concern respecting 
interference with constitutionally assigned and separated functions, the 
broadest form of the deference-as-interference-with-judicial-power thesis 
requires too much revision of constitutional understandings that fit the 
language, history, and structure of the Constitution. 
F.  Auer’s Larger Iterated Delegation Problem:  
Delegation of Legislative Power 
While the strong version of the objection to deference in Justice Thomas’s 
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n concurrence is overly broad, his call to link 
deference analysis to the Constitution’s basic structural features and to 
skeptically view legal doctrines and statutory schemes in tension with those 
structural features is important.  It connects to a fundamental problem that 
has eroded critical constitutional protections against excessive, unchecked 
discretionary power:  the abandonment of serious judicial efforts to keep 
delegation of authority to administrators within constitutional bounds.251 
1.  The Base Delegation Problem 
The Constitution’s framers recognized that the primary functions of 
government assigned to the three branches of the national government—
legislative, executive, and judicial—could not be exactly defined or 
hermetically insulated from the functions committed to other branches.252  
Yet, as best articulated by Madison, the framers even more firmly believed 
that keeping each branch to its own functions—keeping one branch from 
expanding its remit into territory constitutionally committed to one of the 
other branches—was critical to protecting liberty.253  The branches did not 
enjoy authority to exercise the power committed to another branch—the 
courts and executive branch, for example, could not make law, nor could the 
legislative branch reserve to itself the authority to implement the law—but 
each branch could exercise some control over other branches’ actions in ways 
that would reduce prospects of one impinging on another branch’s domain.254 
This limitation on officials in any one branch going awry, straying over 
the constitutional lines, includes judicial restraint on Congress delegating 
powers where they do not belong, especially delegating the lawmaking 
authority Congress was empowered to exercise—only in a constitutionally 
prescribed manner, including presentment to the president.255  Chief Justice 
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John Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Wayman v. Southard256 explained 
the line between permissible and prohibited delegations.  Wayman concerned 
the Process and Compensation Act of 1792 (and, in passing, also the 
Judiciary Act of 1789), which provided courts authority to modify the forms 
used for writs and execution of process in particular circuit or district 
courts.257  Courts generally (and historically) control procedural details for 
the manner in which litigation will proceed.  The 1789 and 1792 laws set 
some basic rules for procedures to be used in federal courts but allowed 
federal courts to modify those rules and left many details to the judges.258  
The Court in Wayman distinguished decisions on “important subjects, which 
must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself”259 from the modest degree 
of control over what was essentially a matter of judicial administration (a 
“subject[] . . . of less interest”260) on which Congress could legislate in 
general terms while leaving administrators discretion over the details.261 
Justice Scalia’s Mistretta opinion described the practical import of the 
restriction on delegation and followed essentially the same logic as Madison 
and Marshall.262  Scalia explained that the exercise of executive power at 
times requires adjudicative methods very similar to those of courts and at 
other times calls for elaboration of guiding precepts in ways that look much 
like legislative rulemaking.263  Yet, accepting the propriety of these actions 
is a far cry from saying that administrators or courts can exercise Congress’s 
lawmaking power or that administrators can exercise judicial power in place 
of courts. 
For Justice Scalia, the constitutional structure requires both that executive 
or judicial actions redolent of other powers are undertaken in the exercise of 
powers firmly within those branches’ domains and that the scope of such 
actions is set by law: 
The whole theory of lawful congressional “delegation” is not that 
Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore assign its 
responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather that a certain 
degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or 
judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative specificity or 
generality of its statutory commands, to determine—up to a point—how 
small or how large that degree shall be.264 
Where officials exercise powers properly assigned to them, they may at 
appropriate times exercise ancillary powers such as making rules or 
adjudicating their implementation.265 
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2.  Failures of Enforcement:  Nondelegation’s Open Door 
Although the Supreme Court generally has been faithful to the Madison-
Marshall-Scalia understanding of separated powers when it comes to 
purported exercises of judicial power outside Article III’s framework,266 
delegation of lawmaking authority has been broadly, and improperly, 
allowed.267  After announcing the “intelligible principle” test for permissible 
delegations in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States268—which allows 
statutory assignments of administrative authority that are guided by an 
intelligible principle—the Court has only twice (and not since 1935) found 
that congressional delegations of authority failed to articulate a sufficiently 
constraining directive.269 
Treating this test as an open door has given rise to a Code of Federal 
Regulations that now contains somewhere in the neighborhood of 200,000 
pages of legally enforceable, agency-generated rules, roughly nine to ten 
times as many pages as the congressionally passed laws collected in the 
United States Code.270  These rules go well beyond the sort of modest 
controls over process that were at issue in Wayman or matters such as 
management of personnel or resources within the government’s control that 
were commonly delegated to executive officers in earlier eras.271  Indeed, 
today’s administrative rules regulate facets of almost every business and a 
multitude of individual activities; such rules govern how students and parents 
interact with schools,272 how consumer goods are advertised and purchases 
 
 266. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  But see Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833, 847–59 (1986); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51–54 (1932). 
 267. For illustrative decisions, see, for example, Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–79; Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420–23 (1944); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 
214–18, 225–26 (1943).  Critical commentary includes, for example, Alexander & Prakash, 
Running Riot, supra note 21; Cass, supra note 20; Christopher DeMuth, Can the 
Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121 (2016); Douglas H. Ginsburg & 
Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475 (2016); 
Lawson, supra note 20; Lawson, supra note 249; Rao, supra note 20; Schoenbrod, Separation 
of Powers, supra note 20. 
 268. 276 U.S. 394, 404 (1928). 
 269. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–76 (2001) (holding that 
section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act “fits comfortably within the scope of discretion 
permitted by our precedent”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935). 
 270. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Staying Agency Rules:  Constitutional Structure and Rule 
of Law in the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 228 (2017) (citing CLYDE WAYNE 
CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS:  AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL 
REGULATORY STATE 65 (2016), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20-
%20Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%202016%20-%20May%204%202016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VG6E-UW9K], and Wayne Crews & Ryan Young, Twenty Years of Non-
Stop Regulation, AM. SPECTATOR (June 5, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://spectator.org/ 
articles/55475/twenty-years-non-stop-regulation [https://perma.cc/3BVA-EWDB]). 
 271. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 137, at 111–28; Alexander & Prakash, Running 
Riot, supra note 21, at 1039–41; Cass, supra note 20, at 155–58, 168–70. 
 272. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 98.4 (2018) (establishing a student’s right to not be evaluated or 
examined without prior consent); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2018) (establishing the right to a free, 
appropriate, public education for all children, including children with disabilities). 
2018] AUER DEFERENCE 575 
financed,273 how employers and employees communicate,274 and almost 
anything else one can think of—a far cry from the limited set of decisions 
initially thought appropriate for administrative and executive officials.275 
While much government rulemaking utilizes procedures that can facilitate 
more thoughtful, well-considered, and well-crafted rules,276 no process can 
guarantee the quality of the regulations produced.  More important, no 
administratively generated rule is adopted through the mechanisms 
specifically required for lawmaking by the Constitution:  votes by both 
houses of Congress (differently constituted to represent different sorts of 
constituent interests for differently sized, selected, and temporally situated 
voting groups) and presentment to the president.277  These are the procedures 
that the Constitution’s framers deemed essential to national lawmaking.278  
Without them, the resulting rules are extraconstitutional and lack both legal 
legitimacy and the essential elements that supported cession of power to the 
national government.279 
Although lawyers, judges, and commentators have grown accustomed to 
the devolution of lawmaking authority on unelected administrators, 
Professors Larry Alexander and Sai Prakash provide a litany of potential 
delegations that are laughably far from what any reasonable jurist would 
accept but analytically comparable to the sort of delegations tolerated 
today.280  The fact that Alexander and Prakash’s examples at first blush seem 
so evidently anticonstitutional, and that the great bulk of actual delegations 
of lawmaking authority do not, is evidence of the legal profession’s ability to 
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accept and rationalize whatever set of decisions and practices have become 
the norm.281 
Common rationalizations for delegated lawmaking authority provide scant 
reason for applauding the profession’s analytical prowess.  Despite the 
existence of serious arguments for preferring delegations on policy 
grounds,282 arguments justifying the broad run of existing delegations of 
lawmaking often are thin reeds on which to rest. 
For one, acceptance of delegations of lawmaking power should not be 
predicated on the nostrum that delegations, whether intended or inferred, 
come “at the expense of [Congress] ceding control over the particulars of its 
program to another branch of government.”283  That assumption—which 
gives comfort that Congress would not be giving up control over anything of 
importance—has been engaged to some extent by jurists and scholars who 
are among the most thoughtful and discerning advocates of critical structural 
analysis of constitutional issues, often in the context of explaining 
differences between Chevron deference and Auer deference.284 
It manifestly is not the case, however, that delegations of authority from 
Congress are primarily acts of charity or means by which members of 
Congress selflessly give up control to others.  Instead, each delegation 
performs functions that are useful to those who support it, not least members 
of Congress who gain from avoiding the appearance of responsibility for 
particular determinations or from acquiring more individual power because 
they can influence the relevant set of administrative decisions more than the 
details of related legislative enactments.285 
In the same vein, many other contentions that delegations of lawmaking 
authority should be embraced—because they are essential to modern 
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government,286 are not clearly barred by direct constitutional text,287 or are 
cabined by procedural requirements288—should be seen as little more than a 
fig leaf covering constitutional expansionism.  The point is not that 
prodelegation contentions are frivolous or thoughtless; rather, it is that they 
pull away from the structure embedded in the Constitution.  The requirement 
that the president “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”289 for 
instance, is not a mandate to make law.  Though it is used by some scholars 
as a launch vehicle for the current administrative state,290 it appears in the 
middle of a set of manifestly ministerial duties—between receiving 
ambassadors and commissioning officers—and is anything but an 
assignment of authority to substitute administrative lawmaking for the 
painstakingly constrained and carefully constructed set of procedures 
contained in Article I.291 
3.  Extending Delegations’ Downsides:  Evading Constraint, Auer’s 
Expansion, and Criminal Risks 
The facts highlighted in the last section—that explanations for delegation 
leave substantial room for constitutional questions respecting many 
delegations’ legitimacy and that the practice of delegating (while reducing 
the institutional role of Congress) permits specific members of Congress to 
increase their individual influence over decisions—underscore the 
importance of scrutinizing each delegation for consistency with 
constitutional commands.  That is true whether the delegation is of first-level 
discretionary authority to implement statutory instructions or second-level 
discretionary authority to further effectuate an agency’s effort to do that 
through rulemaking. 
Yet, further expanding discretionary authority, as Auer does, by extending 
it to additional decisional steps should trigger special scrutiny, if for no other 
reason than to assure that the authority comes in fact from legislative 
direction rather than from the sort of “matryoshka doll”–style approach 
embraced by Auer, which (like the Russian nesting dolls) permits each 
delegation to lead to another one.292  While modern commentary sometimes 
recalls explanations from Madison or Hamilton of the importance of 
particular structural features of the Constitution for protection of liberty, 
there is less often recognition that Madison’s and Hamilton’s arguments did 
not represent the skeptical side of the debate over control of official power.  
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The framing generation was divided between those in the Federalist camp—
who thought those structural features sufficiently protected against 
expanding national authority, especially concentrated discretionary 
authority—and the anti-Federalist camp—which doubted that the 
Constitution’s structures (or any structures for a sovereign national 
government) could contain officials’ impulses to self-aggrandizement and 
the potential for abuse of power that accompanies it.293 
The concept of delegated power informed a central concern for both sides 
of the debate over the Constitution and, indeed, for broader debates in the 
framing generation.294  The conceit underlying the Federalist arguments was 
that power was delegated to the national government from the people and 
that the delegation to exercise power through specific structures would 
protect against the arrogation and abuse of discretionary power that had 
produced invasions of liberty elsewhere.295  Express commitment of power 
to the president, the courts, or other officials generated controversies over 
delegation from the days of the Marshall Court to the late 1930s, when 
questions arose respecting subdelegation of the Secretary of Agriculture’s 
responsibility to grant a hearing before setting permitted rates under the 
Packers and Stockyards Act.296  The Morgan cases grappled with the degree 
to which a cabinet officer could rely on subordinates to perform tasks for 
him, with the Supreme Court first significantly constraining subdelegation 
before ultimately sustaining an accommodation designed to signal greater 
investment of personal review than the Secretary would give to a routine 
matter.297 
The issue presented by the Auer doctrine, in marked contrast to the 
questions of subdelegation at issue in Morgan, involves an expansion of 
power that will frequently be both surreptitious and in tension with basic 
separation-of-powers notions.  The difference between these contexts is 
important.  Subdelegation of the Morgan variety can raise due process issues, 
similar to questions respecting partiality and predictability that underlie both 
Professor Manning’s objection to Auer deference and the Court’s objection 
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in Christopher.298  But the vast run of subdelegations will not raise 
significant issues.299  The text of the Constitution itself suggests recognition 
that the president will delegate particular functions to assist him in 
discharging his constitutional duties, framing the Take Care Clause in 
purposely elliptical form (not directing the president to execute the laws 
faithfully but to see that they are faithfully executed) and providing for 
appointment of department heads and inferior officers (officials whose 
principal functions will be carrying out tasks formally assigned to the 
president).300 
The construction of formally adopted agency rules, however, is more about 
the expansion of government power and potential abuse of power than about 
the mechanics of its exercise.  It can impose burdens on individuals and 
entities subject to the regulations and alter the impact of rules without the 
sort of advance warning that notice-and-comment rulemaking is designed to 
provide.301  Even with opportunities for subsequent judicial review, the 
thumb on the scale that Auer deference provides can both prejudice outcomes 
and incentivize adversely affected entities to capitulate rather than litigate 
even when they have strong grounds to believe that the administrative 
construction is inappropriate.302  Announcement that courts will set aside 
administrative interpretations that change the meaning of a rule without fair 
notice to those who must comply with it will ameliorate the effect of a 
deference rule, but it will not fully—perhaps not even substantially—
eliminate those effects. 
Another consideration, not often linked to Auer deference—the frequency 
with which transgression of administrative rules provides grounds for 
criminal punishment—adds extra weight to concerns about expanding 
administrative power.303  The base concern is placing lawmaking authority 
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that can be the basis for the most significant, coercive, government power in 
the hands of administrators who are not elected, do not need to go through 
the rigors of bicameral legislative procedures, and do not require presentment 
to and agreement from the president.  It is difficult to find a place in our 
constitutional structure for such authority.304 
Further, enabling creation or alteration of criminally enforceable 
requirements through administrative processes effectively lowers the bar to 
creation of criminal liability.  Beyond its tension with constitutional 
commands, this procedural change makes the body of rules much larger.305  
That not only expands bases for criminal liability, it also increases the 
likelihood that those who are affected by the law will be caught (reasonably) 
unaware of the law’s commands,306 that many more criminally punishable 
transgressions, hence, will occur,307 and that enforcers’ discretion will be 
greatly expanded (given the much larger realm of potential enforcement 
actions and the probability that enforcers’ resources will not expand 
commensurately).308 
This complex of concerns suggests a further reason to demand, at a 
minimum, clear commitment of legislated discretion over interpretation and 
application of rules as a predicate for judicial deference.  In contrast to Auer’s 
rule of deference based on regulatory ambiguity, this approach should 
channel deference into limited areas where it fits legitimate statutory 
commitment of authority to administrators. 
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CONCLUSION 
Concerns about Auer deference given voice by justices, judges, and 
scholars rightly point out difficulties with its assumption that ambiguous 
administrative rules essentially confer discretion on administrators to adopt 
any reasonable construction of those rules.  Administrators hardly can be 
thought constitutionally capable of conferring discretionary authority on 
themselves and their successors.  Deference to administrative decisions in 
such settings is in tension with structural-constitutional concepts, due 
process–related requirements of impartiality in rule construction, and 
concerns about predictability and manipulability of rules (i.e., the “fair 
notice” or “fair warning” concern).  Technical expertise or experience 
enjoyed in greater measure by administrators than judges is not enough to 
justify deference in such settings.  In short, eliminating the Auer doctrine in 
its present form serves important legal and governance values. 
However, when Congress by law confers discretionary authority on an 
administrator or administrative agency—and that authority does not exceed 
the permissible scope of what Congress can delegate to an administrator—
there is no sound basis for automatically treating that assignment as a nullity.  
When delegations are not problematic, exercise of discretionary authority—
and the corollary of deference by reviewing courts—can be defended. 
Yet, when delegations are at most only arguably consistent with the 
Constitution, extending deference—and especially expanding deference as 
Auer does in seemingly endless fashion—exacerbates delegations’ 
difficulties.  Reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine is much to be 
hoped for—it would not eliminate the expansive administrative state but 
would rein in some of its worst abuses and most constitutionally questionable 
aspects.309  That hope would fly in the face of eighty years of almost 
complete acquiescence in broad, unstructured, even inexplicable delegations 
to administrative agencies. 
Absent such a development, demanding that the statutory basis for 
deference is clearly articulated—that Congress plainly convey authority for 
administrators to exercise discretion at the second level of rule 
implementation as well as the first level of more direct statutory 
implementation—is a modest first step in cabining problems associated with 
constitutionally questionable delegations of lawmaking authority.  Both 
advocates and critics of the administrative state should support grounding its 
assignments in lawmaking that meets basic constitutional commands. 
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